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If the language of a statute is plain, how can interpreting that statute create
a hard case? And if a case is hard, how can recourse to the statutory language
help resolve the case? This essay will explore the apparent paradoxes raised
by these questions. In his recent book, The Language of Judges, Lawrence
Solan, a lawyer first trained as a linguist, uses linguistics to critique a variety
of opinions in which he believes the Supreme Court has erroneously claimed
that its decision was based on the plain meaning of a statute. After examining
Solan's conclusions, this essay will use his book to show how linguists can
provide very useful information as to whether a text is ambiguous. In doing so,
we hope to go beyond Solan's intentionally narrow undertaking-using
linguistics to critique judicial decisions after the fact for treating ambiguous
texts as if they were plain-to experiment with ways that analysis of
ambiguous texts by linguists could actually assist judges in identifying and
choosing among possible interpretations in a principled and objective way that
remains grounded in the textual language.
It is probably safe to assume that most statutory interpretation cases before
the Supreme Court present hard problems of textual analysis, especially where
there has been a split among the circuit courts of appeal. When this essay was
commissioned in July 1993, Cunningham' reviewed all of the cases in which
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1. Unlike the other authors, Cunningham is not a professionally trained linguist. He has, however,
written about various applications of linguistics to law. See The Lawyer as Translator Representation as
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the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in the ten weeks immediately
preceding its summer recess, with the thought that these cases would be
deferred long enough for one or more linguists to analyze the disputed texts
prior to the oral arguments. He selected three cases in which the outcome
might turn on the meaning of a statutory provision in ordinary language.2
Cunningham then contacted Levi3 to help him identify and recruit academic
linguists willing to analyze the statutory provisions at issue in these cases
using the methods of modern linguistics.4 He prepared one-page summaries
of each of the cases and sent them to the linguists identified by Levi. Thvo,
Kaplan5 and Green,6 agreed to take on major responsibility for the project,
along with Levi.
In each case, our analysis demonstrates that the disputed text is ambiguous
and reveals that the lower courts' efforts to resolve the ambiguity are seriously
flawed as a matter of ordinary language interpretation.7 The linguists' analysis
Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); A Linguistic
Analysis of the Meanings of 'Search' in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 541 (1988) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis]; A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989).
2. Out of the 26 cases for which certiorari had been granted between April 26, 1993 and July 1, 1993,
three cases were selected: United States v. Staples, 971 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 2412 (1993), discussed infra pp. 1573-77; United States v. Granderson, 969 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 3033 (1993), discussed infra pp. 1577-81, 1582; and National Organization for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993), rev'd, 114
S. Ct. 798 (1994), discussed infra pp. 1588-1613. We also selected a fourth case, United States v. Knox,
977 R2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2926, vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993),
and conducted considerable empirical research before the Court remanded the case in November in response
to a change in position by the government regarding the "plain meaning" of the statutory provision at issue
(prohibiting possession of videotapes containing "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" of a
minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) (1988)). In light of this development, we decided not to include our analysis
of Knox in this essay but may discuss the case in a later article. The Justices received galley proofs of this
essay on November 22, 1993, one week before the Court heard oral argument in the Staples case. (The
NOW case was argued on December 8, 1993 and Granderson on January 10, 1994.) Copies were also sent
to counsel of record for the parties in Staples, NOW, and Granderson and to the United States as amicus
curiae in the NOW case. A brief discussion of the Court's decision in the NOW case, which was issued on
January 24, 1994 as this essay was going to press, appears at the end of Part VII, supra note 197.
3. Levi, a theoretical linguist and former chair of the Northwestem University Linguistics Department,
has been writing for more than a decade about social science research on language and law, as well as
about applications of linguistics to legal cases. She has participated as a consultant or expert witness in
more than 20 legal cases since 1978. During that period, she has also served as a sort of clearinghouse for
information relating to both these domains. Her publications include LANGUAGE AND LAW: A
BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE U.S.A. (American Bar Ass'n 1994) and
LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Judith N. Levi & Anne G. Walker eds., 1990).
4. These methods are briefly described infra pp. 1568-69.
5. Kaplan is the author of ENGLISH GRAMMAR: PRINCIPLES AND FACTS (1989). Much of his research
in recent years has focused on the language of law and on the application of linguistics to legal issues. See,
e.g., Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Syntax in the Interpretation of Legal Language: The Vested Versus Contingent
Distinction in Property Law, 68 AM. SPEECH 58 (1993).
6. Green has published widely on matters of syntactic theory and on semantic and pragmatic
interpretation in natural language understanding. She is the author of PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL
LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING (1989) [hereinafter GREEN, PRAGMATICS], and the coeditor of LINGUISTIC
COMPLEXITY AND TEXT COMPREHENSION (Georgia Green & Alice Davison eds., 1988), and LINGUISTICS
AND COMPUTATION (Georgia Green et al. eds., forthcoming 1994).
7. Throughout this essay we use the terms ambiguous and ambiguity in the broad sense found
frequently in legal usage, where the terms describe language about whose interpretation reasonable people
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of the textual ambiguity, however, provides significant guidance toward
identifying the sources of the ambiguity. This analysis narrows the field of
possible interpretations in ways that are both linguistically and intuitively
sensible, making the court's decision more coherent and understandable to the
various audiences the court must address. Although the discussion draws upon
theoretical concepts that may be unfamiliar to lawyers and judges, and in one
case employs empirical research, we believe that our conclusions would make
sense to judges because the analysis articulates linguistic distinctions that all
members of the relevant speech community8 can recognize once they are
brought to conscious attention. Indeed, judges are already accustomed to the
use of dictionaries to serve exactly such purposes: to remind them of what they
already know, to inform them of what they may not know (such as the
meaning of words not encountered before or technical meanings of certain
words in specialized fields such as medicine or science), and to help them
make distinctions.9 Unfortunately, compared to analysis of a particular textual
problem by a trained linguist, dictionaries are a crude and frequently unreliable
aid to word meaning and usage. In fact, for one of the three cases," the
leading dictionaries have definitions that differ exactly as the parties differ over
the meaning of the statutory term, I' and thus provide no objective way of
resolving that dispute over ordinary language meaning.
In the lively debate about statutory interpretation currently occurring
among both legal scholars and judges, the phrase "plain meaning" itself
presents interpretive difficulties.' "Plain meaning" is sometimes invoked to
may differ. In contrast, linguists use these terms to characterize only one category of such language:
language that has two (or more) specific and specifiable competing meanings. Ambiguity in this narrower
sense can be further distinguished between the ambiguity of a single word (lexical ambiguity)-for
example, pen as either writing instrument or animal enclosure, or ambiguity of sentence structure (structural
ambiguity)-for example, The chicken is ready to eat as either The chicken is ready for someone to eat or
The chicken is ready to eat something. When we wish in this essay to narrow the use of ambiguity to what
linguists treat as ambiguity, we will use the terms lexical ambiguity and structural ambiguity.
8. A speech community has been defined as "a community sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct
and interpretation of speech." DELL H. HYMES, FOUNDATIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTIcS 51 (1974). There are
any number of overlapping speech communities that share English as their primary or sole language. The
assumed relevant speech community for our analyses is the contemporaneous set of literate and well-
educated native speakers of English in the United States, except where technical legal meaning is involved,
in which case the community is the smaller professional subset of lawyers and judges. Congress enacted
the statutory provisions at issue in the three cases within the past 25 years, making unlikely the possibility
of significant difference in linguistic conventions between the community at the time of enactment and
today. Even if such differences exist, the community at the time of the judicial decision is still the relevant
community for at least some purposes when that decision relies on ordinary language.
9. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) ("IT]he court is bound to take judicial notice, as it
does in regards to all words in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not
as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.") (citations omitted).
10. National Org. of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
2958 (1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
11. The dispute is over the meaning of enterprise as a necessary element for a claim under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). See Scheidler, 968
F.2d at 625-30.
12. For a representative sample of the extensive scholarship recently produced on this subject, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); William N. Eskridge,
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indicate that the meaning of a provision is "clear" and "unambiguous." The
following statement from a recent Supreme Court decision is typical:
In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the
language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an
issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most
extraordinary circumstance, is finished.... The controlling principle
in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must give
effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written.'
3
When the "plain meaning" rule is given this interpretation, one would not
expect the rule to be invoked very often in Supreme Court opinions, unless the
issue were whether an extraordinary circumstance required inquiry beyond the
plain meaning. For if the statutory provision was clear and unambiguous, one
would not expect to find the kind of disagreement among lower courts that
warrants Supreme Court review. But as Frederick Schauer has persuasively
shown, the "plain meaning" cases that have occupied much of the Supreme
Court's attention in recent years did not necessarily become hard because of
the "exceptional situation" caveat to the plain meaning rule:
[In many of the statutory construction cases of the 1989 term] where
the plain meaning is subject to dispute, there still seems to be
agreement that it remains the appropriate focus of legal argument....
[T]he grounds for the debate, even when there was a debate, were not
whether plain meaning would dominate, but just what the plain
meaning was.' 4
One of Solan's most powerful critical moves is to analyze the seemingly
embarrassing paradox in Supreme Court cases where all nine Justices agreed
that the meaning of a provision was "plain," but split five to four over what
that provision meant.'
5
At other times, "plain meaning" seems to take on a different sense, one
that perhaps explains how hard cases can focus on plain meaning. In the
following recent dissent, Justice Scalia points to the rule of "plain meaning"
as being about ordinary rather than unambiguous meaning.
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice
Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992); Symposium, A
Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992).
13. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992) (Kennedy, J.); see also
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (unanimous decision) ("When we find
the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional
circumstances.").
14. Schauer, supra note 12, at 242-43.
15. See infra pp. 1571, 1582, and 1585.
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I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the
meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of
the language in its textual context; and second, using established
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that
some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If
not-and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears
plain-we apply that ordinary meaning.'
6
For Justice Scalia, and quite possibly for a number of his fellow Justices,
invocation of "plain meaning" represents a decision to give greater weight to
the text as compared to legislative history and policy considerations. William
Eskridge has termed this approach the "new textualism"'17 and has identified
several policy justifications advanced for this greater attention to text: (1) the
ordinary meaning of the text is a more reliable guide than legislative history
to the intent of all the actors in the federal legislative process (including the
President who refrains from exercising veto power); (2) the ordinary meaning
is more accessible and comprehensible to officials and citizenry affected by the
legislation; and (3) ordinary meaning can constrain judicial discretion more
effectively than can recourse to legislative history.'
Much of the scholarly attention devoted to new textualism has attacked the
soundness of one or more of these policy justifications. This essay does not
address these. difficult jurisprudential issues. Rather, it explores what assistance
linguistics can give to a judge to the extent she chooses for whatever reason
to use the ordinary language meaning of a text to guide her decisionmaking.
Linguistics has something to offer for both versions of the "plain meaning
rule." For the "plain means unambiguous" side, linguists can determine
empirically whether a phrase is ambiguous as a matter of ordinary language.
Even more importantly, for Justice Scalia's "plain means ordinary meaning"
strand, linguists can help a judge explore and articulate the judge's intuitive
but usually unconscious understanding of ordinary meaning. "Ordinary"
meaning can be ambiguous at times. Where an ordinary language reading of
a text can produce two or more plausible interpretations, judges face a
dilemma. How can two judges discuss, much less resolve, differing views
about what a provision "plainly" means? According to Eskridge, the "new
16. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (199 1). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. Id.; see also Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054
(1993) (O'Connor, J.) ("When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its
ordinary or natural meaning."); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (Blackmun, J.) (stating
that when a term is not specifically defined in statute, court starts "with the assumption that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used") (quoting Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
17. Eskridge, supra note 12, at 623.
18. Id.; see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
A fourth argument for reliance on ordinary meaning is that it may produce more internally coherent case
law than decisionmaking that assigns new technical meaning to key terms that have well established, albeit
complex, meanings in ordinary usage. See Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis, supra note 1.
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textualism" would replace reference to legislative history with "dictionaries and
grammar books ... and the common sense God gave us."' 9 As this essay
hopes to show, judges rely on dictionaries at their peril to resolve questions of
meaning, but the methods of linguistic science can significantly inform their
innate "common sense" about their own language, thus providing some
objective and principled ways to deliberate over hard cases of interpretation. 20
In Part I we summarize Solan's overview of the discipline of linguistics
as it might relate to the study of law and add some observations of our own.
Parts II through V illustrate how linguistics can explicate hard cases arising
from uncertain relations among words in a sentence or between words and
their larger context. All the examples are drawn from Supreme Court cases:
Parts II and V are based on Solan's analysis of past Supreme Court decisions,
while in Parts Ili and IV we propose analyses of two cases pending before the
Supreme Court in the 1993-94 term. Parts VI and VII address the problem of
interpreting words referring to conceptual categories whose boundaries seem
to be uncertain or "fuzzy." All the examples relate to statutory terms in the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): Part VI to
Solan's analysis of past Supreme Court decisions interpreting RICO, and Part
VII to our extended analysis of another RICO case pending before the
Supreme Court. Part VII is, significantly, the longest section of this essay
because, unlike the analyses in Solan's book, it illustrates the use of empirical
research methods which expand the database for analysis beyond the linguist's
introspection and intuitive understanding of his own language.2
I. LINGUISTICS AND THE LAW
One of many refreshing things about The Language of Judges is that,
although the book is published by a leading university press, its author is not
an academic but a practicing lawyer. Lawrence Solan received a Ph.D. in
linguistics from the University of Massachusetts, but decided to go to Harvard
Law School rather than become a college professor. Following a clerkship with
a New Jersey Supreme Court justice, he joined a New York City law firm,
where he is now a partner.
Given Solan's background as a professionally trained linguist, one might
expect his book to focus on ways that linguistics could contribute to the work
of judges, especially to help them decide hard cases. His project, however, has
a different focus: "The issue that [Ronald] Dworkin raises is how judges
19. Eskridge, supra note 12, at 669.
20. This essay does not contend, though, that linguistics will make hard cases easy or produce the
"right answer" to cases.
21. Additional information about the empirical methods and results discussed in Part VII is found in
the appendices to this essay and is on file with the authors.
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decide hard cases. The issue that I raise is a different one: how judges attempt
to mask the fact that a case is hard in the first place."2
Solan uses linguistics to demonstrate how judges avoid acknowledging
demonstrable ambiguity. He urges judges faced with hard cases to
acknowledge both the indeterminacy of the text and their reliance on
nontextual sources for their decision. Solan's book does more, however, than
enlist linguistics in the service of a familiar realist critique of judging. First,
it explains the discipline of linguistics with clarity, both in an excellent
overview that appears in the first chapter and throughout the remainder of the
book. Second, it progressively educates the reader as to the wide variety of
ways linguistics can illuminate legal texts, as Solan carefully walks through
each example of how the judges got it wrong. Third, the book goes beyond its
professed narrow goal of critiquing existing judicial practices to show how the
explication of the shared competence of all speakers can provide a basis for
improving the quality of judicial discourse.
Solan begins the first chapter of his book by summarizing Justice
Cardozo's famous discussions of the paradox of law:
[The law must] be both sufficiently flexible to accommodate new
cases as they arise and sufficiently rigid to maintain its predictive
power. If the law is not flexible enough, then it is doomed to
irrelevance and to becoming the source of injustice. If the law is too
flexible, then it becomes so unstable that it fails to define with any
reliability people's rights and obligations .... 23
He then quotes Cardozo directly:
No doubt the ideal system, if it were attainable, would be a code at
once so flexible and so minute, as to supply in advance for every
conceivable situation the just and fitting rule. But life is too complex
to bring the attainment of this ideal within the compass of human
powers.24
Solan asserts that Cardozo's wistful fantasy of the "ideal code" describes the
reality of language. This is true in the sense that our language is flexible
enough to enable us to use it in describing-or imagining-circumstances that
are quite novel to us. Moreover, just as we encounter new experiences all the
time and use our existing language to talk about them, so we routinely hear
sentences we have never heard before and yet interpret them without pause and
usually without conscious effort. That we accomplish these cognitive tasks
22. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 208 n.10 (1993).
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 13 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (1921)).
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with relative ease and swiftness does not mean, however, that our
interpretations of what we hear and read are invariably correct.
Although we are reluctant to take literally Solan's description of language
as an "ideal code," it is true that linguistics has made considerable progress in
finding and analyzing predictable order in the seemingly infinite variety of
speech. The same exploratory methods that have enabled linguists to make
significant scientific progress in recent decades can also assist judges in finding
and analyzing predictable order in the complex textual issues which so
frequently make cases hard.
What is the nature of this discipline, which is at the same time so
appropriate for use by judges and yet still so unfamiliar to most? Simply
stated, linguistics is the scientific study of human language. Linguistics
addresses such questions as: What do you know when you know a language?
What do you learn when you learn a language? What do all languages have in
common? How do languages differ? The analyses in this essay draw primarily
upon three areas in the field of linguistics: syntax-the principles governing
the structure of sentences; semantics-the principles governing representational
connections between language and the world, and governing meaning
connections among words and sentences; and pragmatics-principles governing
how interpretation can be affected by context.'
Linguists test their hypotheses according to the familiar principles of the
scientific method: they deduce contrasting predictions of opposed hypotheses
and measure those predictions against observable aspects of reality. Because
the hypotheses and their predictions do not typically involve observable reality,
and because the reality that linguists try to describe is the set of abstract and
complex rules underlying language use, linguists have to make inferences from
people's linguistic behavior under both natural and controlled conditions. They
analyze the contexts in which people naturally use words and constructions, in
order to infer the senses of those words or the discourse function of those
constructions. Linguists also investigate the judgments made by native speakers
about whether a given sentence could mean something particular or whether
it would be natural to use it to mean anything at all. While intuition guides the
critical first steps of linguists, their hypotheses are always subject to empirical
testing.26 Several types of empirical tests will be demonstrated later in this
essay in the discussion of one of the pending Supreme Court cases.
25. Other areas of linguistics are phonetics-the study of the mechanics of speech sound production
and the classification of speech sounds; phonology-the rules governing the sound system of a language;
morphology-the rules governing the internal structure of words; and discourse analysis--various
approaches to the structure of discourses (stretches of speech or writing longer than a sentence). Each of
these areas of linguistics can be applied to one or more languages, or to language generally as in the study
of linguistic universals.
26. The commitment to test conclusions empirically is an important feature that identifies linguistics
as a science and distinguishes it from philosophical inquiry, which is not similarly constrained.
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The routine work of linguists is to articulate the conventions that
distinguish one language from another. Ordinary speakers of our language are
generally unaware of these conventions, and are unprepared to articulate them.
English speakers, for example, might have difficulty explaining why they say
the tall one and someone tall, but not the one tall or tall someone, despite the
fact that it would never occur to them to speak any differently. Somewhat
similarly, ordinary speakers are not aware of how many different kinds of
linguistic conventions they are unconsciously relying on for every sentence
they utter or interpret, from rules of pronunciation to rules of syntax, and from
rules of contextual inference of facts to rules for recognizing and reflecting
social parameters of a particular interaction. Just as we are largely unaware of
the breadth of this system of unconscious linguistic competence, so we are
largely unaware of the depth of specificity that can be incorporated into a
single convention. 7
In his book, Solan most frequently applies the linguist's ability to articulate
linguistic conventions to the analysis of contested legal texts through the
following steps. First, he identifies the portion or feature of the text that
appears to be at issue in a reported case. He then provides one or more
examples of non-legal discourse that seem to be ambiguous in the same way
as the legal text. He shows that the ambiguity of these ordinary language
examples can be explained through one or more well recognized linguistic
principles, and often shows how the ambiguity disappears if the expression is
reformulated. In these examples, Solan is able to use the reader's own
competence as a speaker of English to validate the application of the linguistic
principle. Finally, Solan extends the linguistic principle back to the legal text
to explain how, as a matter of ordinary language, the text is ambiguous in non-
obvious ways. Solan's approach operates most clearly and successfully in cases
where the contested text is structurally ambiguous, and so we begin our
discussion with such cases.
II. STRUCTURAL AMBIGUITY
Solan suggests that the first problem with the conventional version of the
plain meaning rule, the version that equates plain with unambiguous, is that "it
is not always easy to tell when a statute is ambiguous. 28 He then sets
himself the task of discussing "from a linguistic point of view, what it means
for language to be clear, and what causes language not to be clear."'29 The
27. Trying to explain these conventions to non-native speakers of English is one situation that forces
us to recognize such complexities. For example, imagine trying to explain which objects in the world can
be called tall as opposed to high, or trying to tease out the subtle differences between: I lived there, I was
living there, I have lived there, I did live there, and I have been living there.
28. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 93.
29. Id. at 94.
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two major causes of statutory ambiguity, according to his analysis, are
"structural ambiguity" and problems of categorization." The latter topic,
which Solan refers to as "concepts with fuzzy boundaries,"3' will be
discussed in Parts VI and VII of this essay.
In cases of structural ambiguity, interpretive difficulties arise not from
indeterminacy as to the meaning of individual words but from ambiguity as to
the relationship of the words in a sentence structure. A famous example in
linguistics is this phrase:
(1) old men and women32
This can refer to (a) men who are old and women who are old, or to (b) men
who are old and women of any age. The difference depends on whether old
forms a constituent with just men, or whether it forms a constituent with the
coordinate phrase men and women.
Solan illustrates how structural ambiguity can create hard cases with two
Supreme Court cases that were "hard" because of ambiguity as to the
relationship between the adverb knowingly and the rest of a sentence in a
statute.
In United States v. Yenian,33 the interpretive challenge arose under the
federal False Statement Act, which provides in r~levant part: "Whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
knowingly and willfully... makes any false.., statements.., shall be
fined.., or imprisoned .... ,34 Yermian admitted to making a false
statement on a security clearance form he submitted to his employer, a
government defense contractor. His sole defense was that he did not know that
the false statement was within the jurisdiction of a federal agency; he thought
he was lying only to his private employer.35 The trial court rejected
Yermian's interpretation that knowingly 36 applied to within the jurisdiction as
well as to makes any false statements. The court of appeals agreed with
30. Id. at 95-98.
31. Id. at 96-99, 104-08.
32. We will follow the convention in linguistics of numbering all our examples sequentially, with
closely related examples assigned the same number with differing letters, such as 4(a) and 4(b).
33. 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
34. The provision reads in full:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes
or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
35. 468 U.S. at 66.
36. Throughout this essay, we follow the convention in linguistics of italicizing examples of words
or phrases.
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Yermian, reversing his conviction. The Supreme Court split five to four, with
the majority reinstating the conviction. The question of whether the statute was
ambiguous had particular significance in this case because of the "rule of
lenity," a canon of statutory construction stating that ambiguity in a crimitial
statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant. The majority's
insistence that the statute was unambiguous is striking in that the four
dissenting Justices and the three judges of the court of appeals had a different
view of the scope of knowingly. Writing for the dissenters, then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist stated:
[T]he Court's reasoning here amounts to little more than simply
pointing to the ambiguous phrases and proclaiming them clear. In my
view, it is quite impossible to tell which phrases the terms "knowingly
and willfully" modify, and the magic wand of ipse dixit does nothing
to resolve that ambiguity?3
By bringing to bear the linguistic significance of adverb positioning, Solan
persuasively shows how even the threshold question of whether the statute was
ambiguous presented a hard case. He reports that "[l]inguists have for many
years recognized that the position of a prepositional phrase" affects
interpretation of a sentence. 39 Solan demonstrates that sentences with a
prepositional phrase at the end, like sentence (2)(a) below, are more readily
recognized as ambiguous than are sentences that are otherwise identical but
have the prepositional phrase at the beginning, as in (2)(b):
(2)(a) Fred knowingly sold securities without a permit.
(2)(b) Without a permit, Fred knowingly sold securities.40
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his Yermian dissent, prior to its
amendment in 1948, the statute did not prepose within the jurisdiction but
instead read as follows: "[WIhoever shall knowingly and willfully...
make ... any false ... statements... in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States ... shall be fined ... or
imprisoned.",4' According to Solan's analysis, as a matter of ordinary
37. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213-16 (1985) ("Due respect for the prerogatives of
Congress in defining federal crimes prompts restraint in this area, where we typically find a 'narrow
interpretation' appropriate."). Two policy arguments for this rule are that those accused of crimes are
entitled to clear notice of what is illegal, and that strict construction of criminal statutes preserves the role
of the legislature in defining crimes. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 66-67. Solan uses Yermian and Liparota to
claim that the Supreme Court has avoided application of the rule of lenity through linguistically unjustified
denials that ambiguity exists. Id. at 67-76.
38. 468 U.S. at 77-78, quoted in SOLAN, supra note 22, at 70.
39. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 71.
40. Id. at 70-71.
41. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996 (amended 1948), quoted in Yermian, 468 U.S. at 78
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and SOLAN, supra note 22, at 70.
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language, the earlier statute was more ambiguous than the version under which
Yermian was charged. Yet all nine Justices apparently agreed that Congress
did not intend to make any substantive changes in the state of mind
requirement when it rewrote the statute in 1948.42 The majority maintained
that the statute was unambiguous both before and after the amendment, while
the dissenters found it just as ambiguous in either form.
The Court's decision a year after Yermian in Liparota v. United States43
supports Solan's analysis. A majority of six out of eight Justices, 4 including
two from the majority who had found the Yermian statute unambiguous, agreed
that the following provision of the federal food stamp statute was ambiguous
as to the scope of knowingly: "[W]hoever knowingly uses ... or possesses
coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by this chapter
or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall ... be fined ... or
imprisoned ....',45 Liparota argued that he had not knowingly used food
stamps in a manner not authorized by law or regulation, but the trial court
rejected that defense and instructed the jury that it need only find that Liparota
knowingly possessed the food stamps.46
The majority of the Court in Liparota, finding the scope of knowingly to
be ambiguous, 47 applied the rule of lenity to interpret the statute in the
defendant's favor"4 and reverse the conviction. However, the majority did not
respond to the dissenters' argument that the Court was bound by the Yermian
precedent to find the statute unambiguous, since the grammatical position of
knowingly in the pre-1948 version of the statute involved in Yermian was the
same as in the food stamp provision.4 9
42. 468 U.S. at 72-74, 78-79; SOLAN, supra note 22, at 70.
43. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
44. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. Id. at 434.
45. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1988), quoted in SOLAN, supra note 22, at 72. The full provision reads:
Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, whoever knowingly uses, transfers,
acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by
this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such coupons or
authorization cards are of a value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony and shall, upon the
first conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both, and, upon the second and any subsequent conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned
for not less than six months nor more than five years and may also be fined not more than
$10,000 or, if such coupons or authorization cards are of a value of less than $100, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon the first conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, and upon the second and any
subsequent conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not more than one year and may also be
fined not more than $1,000. In addition to such penalties, any person convicted of a felony or
a misdemeanor violation under this subsection may be suspended by the court from participation
in the food stamp program for an additional period of up to eighteen months consecutive to that
period of suspension mandated by section 2015(b)(1) of this title.
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b).
46. 471 U.S. at 422.
47. Id. at 424-25.
48. Id. at 427-29.
49. The Liparota majority distinguished Yennian on the grounds that the provision in that case was
unambiguous and that either interpretation of it would include a mens rea requirement, but did not explain
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III. THE SCOPE OF KNOWINGLY: THE STAPLES CASE
The case of United States v. Staples,50 now pending before the Supreme
Court, demonstrates how structural ambiguity and ambiguity as to specific
word meaning' can interact to create a hard case. The dispute once again
turns on the scope of knowingly in a criminal statute.
Staples was convicted of violating the National Firearms Act because he
failed to register a rifle that he owned. He was sentenced to five years
probation and a $5000 fine. The rifle in question was an AR-15 assault rifle
52
that had been modified so that it could fire more than one shot with a single
trigger pull, making it an automatic weapon, or in other words, a machinegun.
Ordinary one-shot rifles do not have to be registered; machineguns do.
The indictment against Staples charged that he "'knowingly received and
possessed firearms,' described as follows: a. Inland Model Ml .30 caliber
carbine, serial number 5222984; b. SGW Model XM1, .223 caliber rifle, serial
number X2606 both of which had been modified so as to be machineguns, and
neither of which were registered to" him.53 The case nicely presents three
different ways of interpreting knowingly possessed: (1) simple knowledge that
the object was in his possession, (2) additional knowledge that the object was
a dangerous weapon, or (3) further knowledge that the object was a specific
type of weapon, namely a machinegun. As to the first weapon, the M1 carbine
found in his bathroom closet during a search of his house by government
agents, Staples denied even knowing that he possessed the object.5 4 The
prosecution did not contest that the Ml was registered to the defendant's
father, and the father testified that he was going to be away for a few days and
left it in the closet without his son's knowledge. Thus the defendant did not
knowingly possess the M1 even under the most limited of the three types of
knowledge listed above. The jury acquitted Staples on the charge relating to
the MI."5
In contrast, Staples admitted knowing that he possessed the SGW Model
XMI rifle (the AR-15), which the agents found in his home office during the
same search. However, he denied knowing that the rifle "had been modified
so as to be [a] machinegun." This denial made critical the choice between the
second and third possible interpretations of knowingly possessed a firearm
because firearm is a term of art under the National Firearms Act. In addition
to machineguns, the term includes shotguns with barrel lengths under eighteen
how the analogous provision before it could be ambiguous in light of Yennian. Id. at 431-32.
50. 971 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2412 (1993).
51. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the distinction between these two types of ambiguity.
52. The AR-15 is "the civilian version of the military's M-16 rifle," which is an automatic weapon.
Brief for the United States at 5, Staples (No. 92-1441).
53. Id. at 3 n.l.
54. Brief of Petitioner at 4 n.1, Staples (No. 92-1441).
55. Id.
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inches, rifles with barrel lengths under sixteen inches, and hand grenades, 56
but not an unmodified AR- 15 rifle. As a jury instruction, Staples proposed the
third interpretation of knowingly possessed a firearm: "[A]n essential element
of the offense of possessing a machinegun, is that the possessor knew that the
gun would fire fully automatically ... . The trial judge rejected this
interpretation and instead instructed the jury using the second interpretation:
The Government need not prove that a defendant knows he is dealing
with a weapon possessing every last characteristic which subjects it
to regulation. It is enough to prove he knows that he is dealing with
a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood
of regulation. If he has such knowledge, and if the particular item is
in fact regulated, he acts at his peril .... It is not necessary for the
Government to prove that the defendant knew that the weapon in his
possession was a firearm within the meaning of the statute, only that
he knowingly possessed it.
58
However, unlike the situation in Yermian and Liparota, the adverb knowingly
does not appear in the statute, which provides simply that it shall be unlawful
for any person "to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him
in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. . . .' The
government first inserted the word knowingly in the indictment; the trial court
then did the same in the jury instructions. 60 Nonetheless, the indictment and
the jury instruction were "the law" as far as the jury in the trial was concerned,
so, for the purposes of the study done in connection with this essay, the
linguists analyzed the phrase knowingly possessed a firearm as if the statute
so read.6t
56. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (e), (f) (1988).
57. 971 F.2d at 612 n.6.
58. Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted). The jury also received this instruction:
A person is knowingly in possession if his possession occurs voluntarily and intentionally and
not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. The purpose of adding the word
knowingly was to insure that no one would be convicted of possession of a firearm if he did
not intend to possess it.
Id.
59. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1988).
60. It is not entirely clear whether prosecutors and judges routinely add knowingly to the statutory
language in stating the elements of this crime on the grounds that Congress intended some intent
requirement for the crime and simply neglected to state it, or because constitutional due process requires
at least this level of intent. This question is also addressed by the appeals court in Staples. See infra note
67.
61. Because the addition of a knowledge requirement to § 5861(d) is in effect an act of judicial
legislation, albeit perhaps one performed in order to effect legislative intent, the linguists' analysis is
addressed to the courts as it would be to a legislature. In other words, it is up to the Court in the Staples
case, like a legislature, to decide the appropriate state of mind requirement. That requirement then should
be enacted with minimal ambiguity and maximal comprehensibility for those affected by the enactment.
Indeed, the ambiguity of the phrase knowingly possessed a firearm has obscured the state of mind
requirement imposed by the various lower courts that have interpreted this provision. See Staples, 971 F.2d
at 618-19 (Ebel, J. concurring) (collecting and discussing the various circuit court statements on state of
mind required for conviction under § 5861(d)). One might almost suspect that, like legislators on some
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The threshold question of interpretation is whether firearm is to be
understood as defined in the National Firearms Act or according to its ordinary
meaning. Because possession is an indictable offense only if the item
possessed is a firearm within the meaning of the Act, it seems reasonable to
begin by assuming that firearm is to be interpreted according to its statutory
definition. That definition states that "[t]he term 'firearm' means [among other
things] ... a machinegun." 62  Thus the phrase knowingly possessed a
machinegun should be legally equivalent to the language of the indictment in
this case.
The Staples case presents one instance of a well-studied class of
expressions using verbs that describe attitudes.63 In ordinary English usage,
when we assert that an individual holds an attitude (such as knowing,
believing, wanting, or expecting) toward a proposition, we accurately ascribe
that attitude to the person only insofar as he himself would recognize that he
holds the attitude toward that proposition. For example, suppose Smith knows
that Harold Baker is her neighbor. Even if we know that Harold Baker is a
judge, we cannot assume Smith knows that her neighbor is a judge. Thus the
truth of both (3)(a) and (3)(b) does not entail the truth of (3)(c).
(3)(a) Smith knows that her neighbor is Harold Baker.
(3)(b) Harold Baker is a judge.
(3)(c) Smith knows her neighbor is a judge.
Similarly, if Smith knows that Harold Baker is a judge, but does not know that
Judge Baker lives next door to her (for example, she mistakenly thinks her
neighbor is a trial lawyer named Arnold), then it still might be correct to assert
3(d).
(3)(d) Smith doesn't know her neighbor is a judge.
Logicians express this idea by the maxim "substitutability of identicals does
not preserve truth in opaque contexts." An "opaque context" is a context
occasions, the various courts have taken advantage of this ambiguity to hide the actual import of their
action, and in effect impose strict liability in cases like Staples. The addition of knowingly in the indictment
thus creates a false impression that conventional standards of criminal culpability have been met when
actually the relevant knowledge, that the object is a rifle, implies no wrongful intent.
62. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1988). Machinegun is itself specifically defined in the next part of the statute:
The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be
readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a
single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such
weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts
designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination
of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under
the control of a person.
26 U.S.C. § 5846(b) (1988). In contrast to the definition of firearm, the definition of machinegun, at least
the first sentence, appears fairly similar to ordinary language meaning.
63. This observation was made by Green, who performed the initial analysis of the Staples case.
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within which different descriptions of the same object cannot be substituted
without altering the proposition expressed by the statement. 4 In our example,
"Harold Baker" and "her neighbor" are the equivalent terms which cannot be
substituted freely in a sentence about what Smith knows.
Restated in terms applicable to the Staples case, the question is whether
a person knows that he possesses an object meeting a particular description (a
machinegun) if he knows that he possesses the object, but does not know that
it satisfies that description. In the phrase knowingly possessed a I
the clause following knowingly is in an opaque context. Presumably the phrase
knowingly possessed is equivalent to possessed and knew that he possessed.
According to the principles discussed above, the statement Staples knew that
he possessed a machinegun is true only if both of the following are true
statements at the relevant time:
(4)(a) Staples knows that Staples possesses X and
(4)(b) Staples knows that X is a machinegun.
The only way to make the indictment consistent with the trial judge's
explanation of it to the jury is to make the implausible claim that the
indictment used the single word firearm with two different meanings in the
same sentence. This would amount to treating firearm as meaning simply gun
when speaking of what Staples knew, but as meaning machinegun as to what
he possessed.
Whether simply knowing that the object in one's possession is a gun is a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, either in terms of the intent behind the Act
or in terms of due process, is a question beyond the scope of this essay.65 The
Supreme Court has at least three different options for defining the state of
mind required for this crime: (1) conviction if Staples knew he possessed the
object, even if he knew nothing about its characteristics; 66 (2) conviction if
Staples knew he possessed the object and knew that it was a gun, even if he
thought it was the kind of gun that does not need to be registered; or (3)
64. See, e.g., WILLARD V. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECr 141-56 (1960).
65. The jury instructions themselves indicate that the reason they contain the word knowingly is to
distinguish possession that is voluntary and intentional from possession "because of mistake or accident
or other innocent reason." See supra note 58. If so, this rationale is inconsistent with an interpretation
providing that the possessor need not know the identity of what is possessed to be guilty of illegally and
knowingly possessing it. The theory in the jury instructions appears to be that if the object is of a sort that
the possessor suspects might be regulated, it is incumbent on her to determine exactly what it is. However,
this rationale is insufficient to distinguish intentional and voluntary possession from accidental or mistaken
possession. If Smith orders a case of wine, and a wooden crate labelled "Cabemet Sauvignon" is delivered
to her house, she has no reason to open it immediately and examine the contents just because wine is a
regulated substance. Yet it might contain something else instead of, or in addition to, the wine; it could
happen that she was an unwitting conduit for a conspiracy, involving say, her cook and the wine merchant,
to import arms and drugs. Surely we would not say she knowingly possessed the contraband, even though
she intentionally and voluntarily possessed the box that contained it.
66. Presumably this broadest standard would still result in the acquittal for possession of the MI
carbine. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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conviction only if Staples knew he possessed the object and knew that it was
a machinegun.67
Linguistics contributes to legal understanding by establishing that if the
Court opts for either the first or second of these, no subsequent indictment or
jury instruction should use the phrase knowingly possessed a firearm because
an ordinary language interpretation of the phrase implies a higher level of
knowledge. Certainly every effort should be made to draft jury instructions so
that they do not contravene ordinary language principles of meaning. Rather,
the knowledge requirement should be expressed in a nonambiguous way, as
illustrated by Solan's discussion of Yermian and Liparota.8
IV. THE CASE OF THE MISSING REFERENT: UNITED STATES V. GRANDERSON
In the second pending Supreme Court case to be discussed in this essay,
United States v. Granderson,69 we found an interesting parallel to the
implausible way the trial court in Staples apparently tried to assign different
meanings to the same word in the same sentence. However, in Granderson the
problem of interpretation that led to such an implausible reading arose more
from the relation between the text and its larger context (the "missing referent"
of this Part's heading), than from the words of the text alone.
The defendant in Granderson was charged with destruction of mail, a
crime that carries a term of up to six months imprisonment. He pled guilty and
the court sentenced him to a term of five years probation, but he violated that
probation three months later when his urine sample tested positive for cocaine.
The court revoked his probation and sentenced him to a twenty month sentence
of imprisonment, based on the following statutory provision:
If the defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to
the expiration or termination of the term of probation, the court may,
after a hearing pursuant to Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable-
(1) continue him on probation, with or without extending the
term of [sic] modifying or enlarging the conditions; or
(2) revoke the sentence of probation and impose any other
sentence that was available under subchapter A at the time of
the initial sentencing.
67. There is a fourth option: conviction only if Staples also knew that machineguns must be registered.
However, this last condition relates to a mistake of law, not fact, and the Supreme Court has already
decided that conviction under the National Firearm Act does not require proof that the defendant knew that
the law required registration of the object. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
68. For example, if the Court chooses the second option, the indictment could state: "Defendant
knowingly possessed an AR-15 assault rifle, knowing that this rifle was a dangerous weapon, although not
necessarily knowing that it was a machinegun. Defendant failed to register this rifle."
69. 969 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 3033 (1993).
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if a defendant
is found by the court to be in possession of a controlled substance,
thereby violating the condition imposed by section 3563(a)(3), the
court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the
defendant to not less than one-third of the original sentence."0
The trial court interpreted original sentence as referring to the five-year
sentence of probation and ordered imprisonment for twenty months (one-third
of sixty months). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and
ordered Granderson released from custody, apparently interpreting original
sentence to refer to the maximum potential sentence of imprisonment for the
original crime (six months). By the time of the appellate decision, Granderson
had already been imprisoned for more than eleven months.7
In deciding the Granderson case, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Third,7"
Sixth,"7 and Tenth74 Circuits in limiting the maximum term of imprisonment
for a probation violation under the last sentence of § 3565(a) to one-third of
the maximum potential term of imprisonment for the underlying crime.
However, the Eighth75 and Ninth76 Circuits had interpreted original
sentence, as did the trial court, as referring to the term of the probation. The
United States successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to
resolve the circuit split. In urging reinstatement of the twenty-month term of
imprisonment, the government asserted in its brief to the Court that the rule of
lenity is inapplicable because "the language of the statute unambiguously
provides that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment ... must be at least one-
third as long as the original sentence of probation. 77
When the linguists began to review this statutory provision, it was
assumed that the interpretive problem was identifying the referent for original
sentence. This initial review produced the observation that there were only two
possible interpretations of original sentence, and neither one of them was
consistent with that applied by the trial court.78 All other things being equal,
one would assume original sentence means the sentence that was originally
imposed. Since Granderson's original sentence in that sense was sixty months
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (1988).
71. 969 F.2d at 985. The Court of Appeals noted that if Granderson had been separately charged for
possession of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988), he would have faced a statutory maximum of one year
imprisonment. 969 F.2d at 983 n.2. Thus, the maximum combined imprisonment that could have been
imposed for convictions of both mail destruction and cocaine possession was 18 months; the sanction for
violating probation under the mail destruction conviction was 20 months.
72. United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1992).
73. United States v. Clay, 982 E2d 959 (6th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3060
(U.S. July 6, 1993) (No. 93-52).
74. United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. United States v. Byrkett, 961 F.2d 1399 (8th Cir. 1992).
76. United States v. Corpuz, 953 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1992).
77. Brief for the United States at 10, Granderson (No. 92-1662).
78. Green performed the initial review of the Granderson case.
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on probation, revoking the sentence of probation and sentencing the defendant
to not less than one-third of the original sentence would amount to revoking
the sixty months of probation and sentencing the defendant to not less than
twenty months of probation. Alternatively, the drafters of the statute might
have intended original sentence to refer to the maximum allowable sentence
of six months incarceration for the original crime under the sentencing
guidelines. The phrase "any other sentence that was available under subchapter
A" in the second general condition of § 3563 apparently refers to this sort of
original sentence.79 According to this interpretation, "not less than one-third
of the original sentence" would be not less than two months incarceration.
Those who analyzed the provision felt certain though that there was no
linguistic justification based on the text for the trial court's decision, since that
interpretation selected one interpretation of sentence for the type of punishment
(incarceration) and a different interpretation for the term of that punishment
(one-third of the probation period).
Upon further reflection, we conclude that the interpretive problem with
original sentence is not ambiguity as to which prior referent is meant; rather,
original sentence has no contextually identifiable referent. So whatever the
contested provision means, its meaning is not plain as a matter of ordinary
language and it requires extratextual sources for interpretation.
Our analysis then shifted to the lexical ambiguity of sentence as a
technical term in this statute.8" When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, it altered the conventional meanings of sentence and probation.
The provision at issue was not part of the 1984 Act but was added to
§ 3565(a) by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.81 Prior to the 1984 Act,
sentence in the context of criminal conviction referred to the imposition of
imprisonment, fine, or both. Probation was understood to be an alternative to
sentencing.82 Thus, the Federal Probation Act of 1925 referred to the court's
power to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the
defendant upon probation., 83 The 1984 Act, however, made probation a type
of sentence. The Committee Report accompanying the Act explained that under
the new law "unlike current law ... probation is a type of sentence rather than
a suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence. 84 The first section
of the Chapter on Sentencing in Title 18 of the U.S. Code states in relevant
part: "An individual found guilty of an offense shall be sentenced ... to: (1)
79. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) (review of sentence) in which the phrase sentence specified in the
applicable guidelines refers to the maximum sentence that could be imposed under the guidelines.
80. For a useful survey of different views of what distinguishes technical language, especially in law,
see Mary J. Morrison, Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271 (1989).
81. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
82. Corpuz, 953 F.2d at 528.
83. Pub. L. No. 596, 43 Stat. 1259.
84. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess. 88 (1983), quoted in Corpuz, 953 F.2d at 528-29.
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a term of probation... (2) a fine... or (3) a term of imprisonment...."'I
These three different types of sentence will be referred to as sentencep
(probation), sentenceF (fine), and sentence' (imprisonment).
The first occurrence of sentence in the relevant provision16 is sentence':
sentence of probation. The other two occurrences of sentence in the provision,
the verb phrase "sentence the defendant" and the last phrase "one-third of the
original sentence" lack a modifier explicitly indicating whether sentence refers
to probation, imprisonment or fine. Without regard to the context, the most
obvious interpretation would be that sentence in the balance of the provision
also refers to sentencep. However, the provision would then be interpreted as
follows: "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the
defendant to a term of probation not less than one-third of the original sentence
of probation." This meaning is improbable in context because it represents no
increased sanction for the possession of a controlled substance. The Eleventh
Circuit appeared to interpret the latter two occurrences of sentence as sentence,
so that it would read this way: "and sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment not less than one-third of the original sentence of
imprisonment. 87 Unfortunately for this interpretation, there was no "original
sentence of imprisonment." This forced the Eleventh Circuit to interpret
original sentence as if the provision read: "one-third of the maximum sentence
of imprisonment that was available at the time of sentencing."
The trial court and the Ninth and Tenth Circuit courts have produced an
even stranger interpretation. They interpret the provision as if it read "the court
shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment not less than one-third of the term of the original sentence of
probation," shifting the meaning of sentence from sentencep to sentence' and
then back to sentencep.88 This shift in meaning is as linguistically peculiar as
the way in which the Staples trial court seemed to switch from gun to
machinegun in interpreting firearm in one sentence. We felt confident that
there was a linguistically more plausible way to resolve the case of the missing
referent for original sentence, and so turned to a review of the way sentence
is used throughout the chapter on sentencing in the U.S. Code.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1988).
86. By "relevant provision" we mean the last sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (1988). To avoid
confusion, we will use the word provision rather than sentence to refer to this sentence.
87. This interpretation assumes that sentence has a default meaning of sentence' when unmodified.
However, with the exception of this provision, the chapter on sentencing, Chapter 227, assiduously avoids
unmodified use of sentence, thus suggesting strongly that no default meaning should be assumed. See infra
notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
88. Similar terminology appears in the preceding subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), thus making the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling even less plausible as a matter of textual interpretation. Congress showed that it
knew how to distinguish between the sentence actually imposed and the potential range of imprisonment
available at the time of sentencing.
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Review of the entire text of the chapter on sentencing produces the
following observation.39 The provision at issue in Granderson is the only
place in the entire chapter where sentence appears as the verb in a clause
without a modifier to indicate which of the three meanings is intended.
Everywhere else Congress was scrupulously careful not to use sentence
without modification.90 Indeed the Chapter seems to reflect a strong
preference for using the verb phrase "imposed a sentence of " rather
than simply sentenced. This provision is also the only place in the entire
chapter where the phrase original sentence appears. It is as if a speaker of
another dialect-the pre-1984 language of sentencing-had interrupted Chapter
227 to utter the statutory language at issue. The provision only seems to make
sense under the pre-1984 meanings of probation and sentence, in which an
original sentence would always be a sentence of imprisonment that was
suspended if the defendant was "placed on" probation. Thus, analysis of the
textual language by a linguist in this case seems to point toward an
examination of legislative history, particularly a search for evidence that this
provision, added in 1988, might have been drafted with the pre-1984 meanings
in mind. A review of the legislative history reveals that the provision was
literally a last-minute amendment that did not go through the normal
committee process and thus might have been framed without an awareness of
the new meaning of probation as a type of sentence in the federal scheme. 9'
89. We reviewed Chapter 227 of Title 18 by downloading its text from the LEXIS database,
converting it to the WordPerfeet word processing software, and then using the "Search and Replace"
function to bold and capitalize every word containing the string "sentenc." This process took only a few
hours and review of every occurrence in this text of some version of sentence was quite easy. This
modified version of the text of Chapter 227 is on file with the authors.
90. The standard verb phrase is "sentenced to a term of (probation or imprisonment)." See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 3561(a), 3581(a), 3583(a) (1988).
91. Cunningham examined this legislative history with the assistance of reference librarian Peggy
McDermott. This provision apparently first appeared in a floor amendment in the Senate, after the bill had
passed the House, and only one day before the bill passed the Senate. 134 CONG. REC. S15,781 (Oct. 13,
1938) (Byrd Amendment No. 3677 to H.R. 5210). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was a massive and
complex piece of legislation, which takes up 364 pages in Statutes at Large, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181-4545 (1988). The provision may have originated in the following amendment, proposed ten days
earlier, which was not enacted into law:
Section 3565(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following: Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if the defendant tests positive
for illegal use of controlled substances, thereby violating the condition imposed by section
3563(a), on two separate tests taken at least 3 weeks apart, the court shall, in addition to any
other action which may be taken pursuant to this section (A) revoke the sentence of probation
and sentence the defendant to a period of imprisonment, (B) require the defendant to reside and
participate in a residential community treatment center program, or participate in an out-patient
drug treatment program if residential treatment is unavailable or impractical, or (C) require the
defendant to remain at his place of residence pursuant to section 3563(b)(20). Notvithstanding
any other provision of this section, if the defendant tests positive for the illegal use of controlled
substances, thereby violating the condition set forth in section 3563 (a) or (e), on three separate
tests taken at least 3 weeks apart, the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence
the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence.
134 CONG. REC. S14,337 (Oct. 3, 1988) (Byrd Amendments Nos. 3369 and 3370) (emphasis added). The
same set of amendments also contained, in a section having to do not with drug abuse but with use of an
explosive in the commission of a felony, the following pre-1984 use of probation: "Notwithstanding any
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It is striking that neither the briefs of the parties before the Supreme Court nor
any of the five circuit court opinions interpreting this provision reflect
awareness of this particular aspect of the provision's legislative history. The
fact that analysis by a linguist in this case, limited as it is to the four corners
of the text, generates a useful clue for searching legislative history is a
reminder that close attention to text is not necessarily at odds with the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation.
V. DECEPTiVE APPEARANCES OF PLAINNESS: AMBIGUOUS NOuN PHRASES
The potential value of linguistic explication is even clearer in Solan's
ingenious explanation of Sedima, S.P.R.L. it Imrex Co.,92 in which the nine
Justices of the Supreme Court agreed that a statutory provision was
unambiguous and yet split five to four as to its plain meaning. Sedima called
for interpretation of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).93 RICO is Solan's favorite source of examples,
as he "can think of no better source of disagreement over the meaning of
words in a statute than ... RICO." 94 Although RICO is primarily a criminal
statute, § 1964 provides a civil remedy of treble damages to "[a]ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962." 9'
Section 1962, in turn, prohibits "any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise ... [from conducting] such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity.' 96 Sedima alleged in a civil suit that Imrex had
violated § 1962 by submitting inflated bills under a sales contract; its use of
the mails and the telephone to submit the inflated bills constituted federal mail
and wire fraud. Mall and wire fraud are both found within RICO's definition
of "racketeering activity., 97 The issue before the Supreme Court was the
decision of the lower courts, in favor of Imrex, holding that injury "by reason
of a violation of section 1962" must be more than ordinary business loss due
to the inflated billing. Rather, Sedima had to show a "racketeering injury," an
injury "different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts
themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an
activity which RICO was designed to deter."98
Writing for the majority of five, Justice White said:
other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person
convicted of a violation of this subsection .... Id. at S14,269 (emphasis added).
92. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
94. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 77.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
96. Id. § 1962(c).
97. Id. § 1961(l)(B).
98. 473 U.S. at 485 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a
manner forbidden by [§ 1962(a)-(c)], and the racketeering activities
injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim
under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an
additional, amorphous "racketeering injury" requirement."
On behalf of himself and three other dissenters, Justice Marshall wrote:
[T]he statute clearly contemplates recovery for injury resulting from
the confluence of events described in § 1962 and not merely from the
commission of a predicate act. The Court's contrary interpretation
distorts the statutory language under the guise of adopting a plain-
meaning definition, and it does so without offering any indication of
congressional intent that justifies a deviation from what I have shown
to be the plain meaning of the statute. t°°
Solan suggests that subtle ambiguity in the phrase pattern of racketeering
activity may explain how the majority and dissenters could come to opposite
interpretations of a provision that all thought had a plain meaning."' 1 Solan
begins with some ordinary language examples of this type of ambiguity:
(5) A series of rainstorms damaged the house.
(6) A gang of teenagers intimidated the neighbors.'t z
Does the first sentence mean that there were a number of rainstorms, each of
which damaged the house, or that the damage only resulted from the
cumulative effect of the storms? Does the second mean that various gang
members acting individually committed acts of intimidation, or that the
teenagers appeared in a group and intimidated the family by their
numbers?'0 3
Solan explains this ambiguity in terms of a semantic regularity that
linguists have observed in certain complex noun phrases of the form "a noun
1 of noun 2," such as a series of rainstorms or a gang of teenagers, where
noun 1 can be understood as one type of quantifying expression. In these noun
phrases, the expression is ambiguous as to which one of the two nouns is the
semantic "head" of the phrase, and which one is the modifier." If noun 1
is the head, then noun 2 modifies it: it is the series that damages the house and
99. 473 U.S. at 495.
100. Id. at 509-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 102-03.
102. Id. at 102.
103. Id.
104. Solan cites Elisabeth Selkirk, Some Remarks on Noun Phrase Structure, in FORMAL SYNTAX 285
(Peter W. Culicover et al. eds., 1977), on this point. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 102 n.29. Normally, the
modifier would follow the head, as in these unambiguous examples: a child of royalty, an error of logic,
or a mirror of the soul.
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rainstormns explains what kind of series it is, or it is the gang that intimidates,
and teenagers tells what kind of gang. If noun 2 is the head, then noun 1 is the
modifier: it is rainstorms that damage the house, and series adds the
information that the storms came one after another; it is teenagers themselves
who intimidate, and gang adds information about the connections among the
teenagers. Solan terms the interpretation of noun 1 as head the "nondistributive
reading," and noun 2 as head, the "distributive reading."' 5 For the latter, the
action, the damaging or the intimidating, is "distributed" among all the
members of the set rather than attributed to them acting collectively.
Solan then applies this analysis to Sedima. Let § 1964 be paraphrased
0 6
as follows: "If an enterprise's pattern of racketeering activity injures a person's
business, the injured person may sue for treble damages." The majority used
a distributive reading, interpreting activity as the head of the phrase "pattern
of racketeering activity." Thus, to state a civil RICO claim, Sedima needed
only to show that Imrex's activity of mailing inflated bills inflicted the injury.
The dissenters resolved the ambiguity in the other direction: pattern was the
head of the phrase for them. They would have required Sedima to show how
a pattern of racketeering inflicted injury.
The ambiguity is apparent once explicated by Solan. Absent this linguistic
explication, one could easily assign a single interpretation to this subtle
ambiguity either way without recognizing what one had done. Once a reader
interprets one of the nouns as head of the phrase, the sentence seems "plain"
in that it appears to have only one possible interpretation. Without one's own
interpretive process being brought to conscious awareness, one could
understandably conclude that those offering the other interpretation either do
not know how to read or are being intellectually dishonest. Solan does not
indicate his view as to which resolution of the ambiguity conforms better with
ordinary language expectations. 7 He stops at the point of showing that,
contrary to the rhetoric of both sides in Sedima, the language is not clear.
Nonetheless, his analysis might have improved the discourse of the Court in
Sedima had it been available to the Justices. Perhaps they could have agreed
that plain meaning did provide guidance, to the extent that analysis of the
ordinary language meaning of the phrase revealed a two-way ambiguity typical
of certain noun phrases. They might then have relied more explicitly upon
105. Id. at 102.
106. A potential criticism of Solan's analysis of Sedima is that he constructs the ambiguity by
importing the noun phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" from § 1962 into the sentence being
interpreted, § 1964. Strictly speaking, § 1964 as written does not present a noun phrase ambiguity problem.
But the paraphrase is a fair rewriting of § 1964, which incorporates § 1962 by reference. IS U.S.C.
§§ 1962, 1964(c).
107. Solan does suggest that the "more natural" reading of the gang example is the nondistributive
one, that it was the whole group that was intimidating, but he provides no clear explanation for that choice.
He suggests that "the contextual relationship between the group term and the predicate" is a decisive factor.
He does not offer a view as to the better reading of the rainstorm example. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 102.
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interpretative strategies other than appeal to ordinary language to resolve that
choice. At the very least, Solan's analysis shows how seemingly plain
language can create a hard case even at the level of ordinary language
comprehension. Indeed, the apparent inability of linguistic principles alone to
resolve the ambiguity helps explain why Sedima presented the kind of case
worthy of Supreme Court attention.
VI. CONCEPTS wrrH Fuzzy BOUNDARIES
Solan distinguishes the types of interpretative problems represented by the
cases discussed above in Parts II through V from what he terms "categorical
indeterminacy" or "fuzziness." Categorical indeterminacy, he claims, accounts
"for most of the problems that arise in the legal context" over the meaning of
textual language: "The problem arises ... when a statute or other legal
document makes reference to a category of things or events, and a dispute
arises over whether a particular thing or event in question fits into the
category." ' Solan identifies familiar word challenges from philosophy of
language (such as defining the categories of game and .mountain) and from
jurisprudence (such as defining the vehicles prohibited from a park) as being
attributable to this problem."9 He seems to conclude that linguistics is
capable merely of flagging the indeterminacy of such words but not of
assisting judges in resolving that indeterminacy. He illustrates this argument
with further discussion of RICO cases.
Solan effectively distinguishes ambiguity that presents a clear choice
between meanings from the problem of fuzzy conceptual boundaries by
returning to the same phrase, pattern of racketeering activity, discussed in Part
V in relation to the Sedima case. Four years after deciding Sedima, the
Supreme Court returned to this phrase to determine the meaning of pattern. In
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.," the issue was whether a
single scheme to bribe state officials could constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity where the alleged bribery involved multiple acts over a period of time.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals had agreed that a pattern required
proof of at least two different racketeering schemes."' Once again, the Court
split five to four, although all of the Justices voted for reversal. Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan set out the following definition based on "a
commonsense, everyday understanding of RICO's language:""' 2
108. Id. at 96,
109. Id. (game example drawn from LUDWIG WrcrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31-32
(1953); mountain from QUINE, supra note 64, at 126; and vehicle from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 125-26 (1961)).
110. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
111. ld. at 233-35.
112. Id. at 241.
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[T]o prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor
must show that the racketeering predicates [e.g. acts of bribery] are
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity.... Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and
threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this
requirement.'
1 3
He concluded that the plaintiff's allegations met this less stringent definition
of pattern and reinstated its RICO complaint. Concurring, Justice Scalia agreed
that RICO does not require proof of multiple racketeering schemes, but
suggested that RICO's language might be so indeterminate as to be
unconstitutional under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, a problem that in his
view the majority's definition did not cure." 4
Solan offers two linguistic criticisms of the majority's definition of
pattern. First, he questions whether the requirement that acts take place over
a long period of time is soundly based on a "commonsense, everyday
understanding" of pattern, as the majority claimed. He argues that "there is
nothing in the word 'pattern' that requires continuity, except for a period long
enough to permit formation of the pattern itself."' 5 He gives the following
two uses of pattern which seem perfectly acceptable even though the events
took place over a much shorter time period than the majority opinion would
allow:
During the three weeks that he was on drugs, John exhibited a pattern
of violent behavior that we had not seen before and have not seen
since.
The two-week outburst of burnings formed a pattern: only buildings
that had not been occupied for two months were torched."
6
Second, he characterizes the majority definition of pattern as requiring
"relatedness plus continuity" among the predicates." 7 But, he argues,
"relatedness is at least as indeterminate a concept as is patternhood .... Try,
as an experiment, to define relatedness meaningfully so that your definition
has predictive force. You will fail."".. He draws the following conclusion:
Justice Brennan's effort to divine a 'common-sense, everyday
understanding' of the statute from its language is actually an effort to
decompose the word 'pattern' into what he apparently believes are its
113. Id. at 239, 242 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 255-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 105.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added). The Court may have derived this
formula from the legislative history. See id. (citing 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen.
McClellan, the bill's sponsor)); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
118. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 105.
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component concepts. The effort fails, as do most efforts at lexical
decomposition.... Nor would it do to substitute other concepts for
relatedness and continuity. Exactly the same types of problems would
arise. We will always be able to find examples of patterns and non-
patterns that challenge the proposed components.
The problems that the Court faced in construing the word
"pattern" in RICO are, in fact, unavoidable. They result from the
imperfect match between concepts conveyed by the words in a statute
and the virtually infinite variety of events that can occur in the world.
As hard as we may try to avoid the indeterminacy of concepts at the
margins, we will not succeed.... Our knowledge of language...
simply does not answer all of these questions." 9
Solan continues this approach to category indeterminacy with a discussion
of yet another RICO case, United States v. Turkette, 20 in which the meaning
of enterprise was at issue. Relying heavily on statements in the legislative
history indicating that the purpose of RICO was to prevent organized crime
from infiltrating legitimate business enterprises, the court of appeals had held
that enterprise could not apply to organizations that are exclusively criminal.
In reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of plain meaning:
In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If
the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive....
The Court of Appeals, however, clearly departed from and limited
the statutory language....
If Congress had intended the more circumscribed approach
espoused by the Court of Appeals, there would have been some
positive sign that the law was not to reach organized criminal
activities .... The language of the statute, however-the most
reliable evidence of its intent-reveals that Congress opted for a far
broader definition of the word "enterprise," and we are unconvinced
by anything in the legislative history that this definition should be
given less than its full effect.'
2'
Solan's critique of this statement by the Court is equally strong:
[Ilt is wrong to say that "enterprise" could not be understood to
include only legitimate businesses. Generally speaking, that is how the
119. Id. at 105-06.
120. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
121. Id. at 580-81, 593 (citation omitted).
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word is used, and the statute's definition is not really very
helpful ....
... [T]here is nothing the least bit clear about what the word
"enterprise" means in RICO. While we do have a sense of a typical
enterprise, I would be extremely hard pressed to state the necessary
and sufficient conditions for membership in the class of enterprises.
... [Enterprise] becomes a fuzzy concept at the margins.'22
Given that Solan characterizes the problem of "fuzzy boundaries" as the most
common source of hard cases arising from textual interpretation, we were
naturally intrigued by his position that the inadequacies of the decisions in
Northwestern Bell and Turkette were "unavoidable," presumably even with the
assistance of linguistics. Thus we were delighted when one of the pending
Supreme Court cases identified in our review of cases to be argued in
December 1993 and January 1994 not only involved a problem of
categorization, but also concerned the very word enterprise in RICO. We did
indeed find that the puzzle of enterprise presented different kinds of
interpretive challenges than the texts in Staples and Granderson, as evidenced
by our decision to undertake several empirical research projects as part of our
analysis of that puzzle. By the end of Part VI, however, we reach a more
optimistic conclusion than Solan about the potential contribution linguistics can
make to solving the apparent problem of the "fuzzy boundaries" of categories
referenced by words in legal texts.
VII. THE PUZZLE OF ENTERPRISE
A. The NOW Case'23
In 1986 the National Organization for Women (NOW), together with two
women's health centers, filed a civil suit against the Pro-Life Action Network
(PLAN) and a number of other anti-abortion organizations and individual
activists, claiming in part that PLAN had violated RICO through its nationwide
campaign to close medical clinics that provide abortion services. The specific
provision of RICO invoked by NOW provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
122. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 79, 107.
123. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
2958 (1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
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in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt.'24
NOW sought monetary damages and an injunction' 25 to prevent PLAN and
the other defendants from engaging in such criminal activities as trespass,
vandalism, and extortion. 26 The trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim, 27 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
"reluctantly" affirmed the dismissal128 The Supreme Court granted NOW's
petition for certiorari only as to one of the grounds for dismissal: that PLAN
was not an enterprise within the meaning of § 1962(c) and (d) of RICO.'29
The Seventh Circuit applied the following definition of enterprise: "an
association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of
maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence
that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts
constituting the pattern of racketeering activity."' 3 Because this widely cited
definition of enterprise apparently entered RICO case law through the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Anderson, we will refer to it as the
"Anderson definition."
NOW, the United States as amicus supporting NOW's position, and the
RICO defendants each argue in their briefs to the Supreme Court that the plain
meaning of the statute is unambiguous and directs a decision in their favor.
Both NOW and the government start their briefs by asserting that because
enterprise is defined in the statute, no further inquiry (into the legislative
history or otherwise) is necessary."' However, it is apparent upon reading
the definitional section of RICO, § 1961, that the subsection on enterprise does
not state what conditions must be satisfied for something to count as an
enterprise: "'[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (emphasis added). NOW also alleged violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d), which prohibits conspiracy to violate § 1962(c).
125. NOW filed the suit seeking to represent a nationwide class of women seeking abortion services,
and the two health centers acting as name plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all health centers seeking
to perform abortions; the motions for class certification were not decided prior to dismissal.
126. The plaintiffs alleged that PLAN members committed the predicate acts of "racketeering" required
for RICO by violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
127. 765 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. I11. 1991).
128. 968 F.2d at 614.
129. The Court granted certiorari on the question of whether "[i]n addition to [the] statutory 'interstate
commerce' and injury to one's 'business or property' requirements of RICO, should [the] statute be further
limited to cases in which either [the] enterprise or predicate acts has an overriding economic motive?" 62
U.S.L.W. 3027 (U.S. July 20, 1993) (No. 92-780).
130. NOW, 968 E2d at 627 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 F2d 1358,
1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)).
131. Presumably, if enterprise were in fact given a comprehensive technical meaning by statutory
definition, ordinary language usage would be of less relevance. See supra text accompanying note 56
(definition of firearm).
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associated in fact although not a legal entity."'3 Despite occurring in a
section entitled "Definitions," this statement does not define enterprise,
precisely because it does not state necessary and sufficient conditions for
something to be an enterprise. NOW and the government argue as if the
passage began "Enterprise means" rather than "Enterprise includes." Section
1961 does define other terms using "means.' 33 If Congress intended for
includes to be interpreted as means, then anything that fits within one of the
categories listed after includes would count as an enterprise. Most obviously,
such an interpretation would entail that every individual is an enterprise.
Inasmuch as § 1961 does use different verbs in defining other words, it is
reasonable to assume that includes has a different import than means in that
section, just as it does in ordinary language. Subsection 1961(4) on enterprise
seems to assume that the reader already has an understanding of what an
enterprise is, and to instruct the reader that nothing should preclude
considering the listed types of entities as possible enterprises pursuant to that
understanding. In particular, § 1961(4) seems intended as a corrective against
the possibility that the reader's preexisting understanding of enterprise might
cause her to limit the word to legally constituted entities like corporations and
partnerships.' 34
A plain meaning interpretation of enterprise thus cannot begin and end
with the definition section of the statute. Because RICO's so-called definition
of enterprise contains so little information, there seems to be little evidence to
rebut the normal presumption in statutory interpretation, often applied in RICO
cases, that Congress intended the ordinary meaning of the words used.'35
Thus, attempting to buttress its statutory definition argument, NOW next turns
in its brief to Webster's Third New International Dictionary for this definition:
"'Enterprise' encompasses any 'venture, undertaking, project' or 'any
systematic purposeful activity or type of activity.' Based on this definition,
NOW argues that in "its normal usage, 'enterprise' includes virtually any type
of organized venture."' 36 One group of RICO defendants rejoins by quoting
the same dictionary:
But RICO clearly does not incorporate this meaning of 'enterprise';
the statutory definition includes entities, not mere 'activities' or
'designs.' The first concrete definition given for an enterprise is as
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
133. E.g., id. § 1961(1) (."[R]acketeering activity' means .... ); id. § 1961(6) ("'[U]nlawful debt'
means ....").
134. Subsection 1961(4) was used by the Court this way in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580-82 (1981), to hold that enterprise can apply to an illegal association, in particular, an arson ring.
135. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 21 (construing ordinary meaning of the term interest in RICO).
136. Brief of Petitioners at 21-22, NOW, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No. 92-780) (quoting WEBSTER'S
TdIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 757 (unabr. 1971)).
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follows: 'a unit of economic organization or activity (as a factory, a
farm, a mine); esp: a business organization: FIRM, COMPANY.'
137
However, the dictionary widely regarded as most extensive and authoritative,
the Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) does not list "unit of economic
activity," "business organization," "firm," "company," or any similar term in
its definition of enterprise.138 This difference does not seem to be attributable
to variation in dialect between British and American English; several American
dictionaries, including Webster's Second Edition, do not list "business" or an
equivalent for enterprise.139 Also problematic for the RICO defendants'
reliance on dictionary definition would be this definition from yet another
dictionary: "any undertaking; project: a business enterprise.""14 This
definition treats "business" as an example of a much more expansive category
that by its terms--"any undertaking"--could well include PLAN.
Recourse to dictionaries is a notable feature of the "new textualism";
141
and the Court has relied upon them before in interpreting RICO.'42 However,
as this variance among well-known dictionaries illustrates, such reliance must
be very guarded. It is tempting to expect to resolve disputes about the "plain
meaning" of a word by invoking a dictionary definition that purportedly
reveals what the word "properly" means. It is commonly supposed that
dictionaries represent facts of the language that are independent of the users
of the language, and that if a usage does not conform with the description in
the dictionary, the usage is incorrect. This is a misconception, as discussed in
further detail in the conclusion of this essay.
143
Unlike the briefs before the Supreme Court, the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit opinion in NOW relies neither on statutory nor dictionary definitions
in concluding that enterprise means an association "directed toward an
economic goal."'144 Rather, the court relies on RICO case law. The court cites
137. Brief of Respondents Randall A. Terry, Project Life, and Operation Rescue at 20, NOW, 114
S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No. 92-780) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 757 (unabr.
1986) (emphasis and capitalization in the dictionary quotation)). For a more complete quotation of this
definition, see infra Appendix A. This brief makes the same point about the significance of the use of the
word includes rather than means in the statutory definition as presented above, see supra text accompanying
note 132. This brief is the only place we have seen this seemingly obvious distinction recognized.
138. See infra Appendix A for this and eight other dictionary definitions of enterprise.
139. See infra Appendix A (definitions from Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary, Webster's
New Twentieth Century Dictionary, and Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language). The
Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary does list "business firm" in its definition.
140. See infra Appendix A (definition from The World Book Dictionary).
141. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1926 (1991) (dictionary definitions of
mixture); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2365 (1990)
(definition of curriculum); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (definition of
irregularity). See generally Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50 (1993).
142. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 197-204.
144. NOW, 968 F.2d at 627 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 E2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980)).
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Northwestern Bell 45 as authority for the interchangeability of business and
enterprise for RICO purposes. However, interchangeability of two words in a
particular context does not mean that they are synonymous. For example, one
word (business) may refer to a subcategory or example from a larger category
encompassed by the other word (enterprise). The Seventh Circuit also relies
heavily on the Anderson decision and subsequent cases applying it.
Unfortunately the Anderson definition is muddled both in origin and in
application. The Anderson opinion, although thorough and scholarly in many
respects, provides very little explanation 46 for the "economic goal" part of
its definition, which is not surprising since that requirement is entirely dicta in
the Anderson case itself. The alleged enterprise in Anderson was a group of
three people-two county administrators and a salesman--operating a kickback
scheme for county purchases of various highway supplies. The "economic
goal" requirement was dicta because the defendants never argued that the
alleged enterprise lacked an economic goal; the three participants obviously
intended to make money through their scheme. 47 Since the Anderson
decision in 1980, its definition of enterprise has been widely cited but rarely
with any discussion or effect on case outcome. Indeed, in a number of cases
that appear to adopt the Anderson definition, the alleged RICO enterprise is a
government agency, most frequently a police department, a unit of local
government, or a court. Yet not one of these cases acknowledges that it is
peculiar to define a government agency, particularly a court or police
department, as an association that directs its operations toward an "economic
goal.'
148
145. Id. at 629 (citing 492 U.S. at 229). See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text for discussion
of Northwestern Bell.
146. The Anderson court does quote a law review article by Senator McClellan, a cosponsor of the
Act, and a law review note to the effect that "the purpose" of RICO is "economic." 626 F.2d at 1368
(quoting John L. McClellan, Organized Crime Control Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threaten Civil
Liberties?, 46 NoTrRE DAME L. REV. 55, 161-62 (1970), and Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration
of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity, " 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 222 (1975)).
147. The Anderson court emphasized the narrow scope of its decision: "Defendants... argue that the
term 'enterprise' does not encompass an illegal association that is proved only by facts which also establish
the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.' This is the narrow issue we address."
626 F2d at 1365; see also id. at 1365 n.10. The Eighth Circuit held that this association of three people
was not an enterprise because it had no existence independent of the kickback scheme itself. It is
noteworthy that in so holding, the Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected a "plain meaning" approach to
interpreting the meaning of "enterprise" (an approach the court seemed to assume would result in finding
the association to be an enterprise) and invoked legislative history in support of its holding. 626 F.2d 1370-
72.
148. Perhaps the most striking example is the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986), cited by the NOW court as its immediate precedent. Neapolitan
was a police officer who allegedly collected protection money from car thieves. Thus the alleged enterprise
within which he conducted his racketeering activities was his place of employment, the county sheriff's
department. Id. at 492. The defendant apparently never argued that lack of economic goal on the part of
the claimed enterprise defeated the RICO claim. For other cases in which the RICO enterprise was a
governmental unit, see United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 778 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Yonan, 800 F2d 164, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987); United States v. De Peri,
778 F.2d 963, 975 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); United
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Indeed, apart from the NOW decision itself, there appears to be only one
reported appellate decision applying the Anderson definition to find that an
entity was not a RICO enterprise because it lacked an economic goal. In
United States v. Ivic, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit held
that a group of Croatians organized for the purpose of carrying out terrorist
activities was not an enterprise because its goals were political, not economic:
"Defendants joined together not to make money but.., to advance the goal
of Croatian independence."' 49 Judge Friendly primarily relied upon one
textual argument for the Anderson definition. He looked to the use of
enterprise in the two preceding subsections of § 1962 that prohibit investing
proceeds from racketeering activity in "any enterprise"'50 and prohibit the
use of a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire "an interest in... any
enterprise."'' He concluded that, "[a]lthough perhaps somewhat wider in its
reach than 'business,' an 'enterprise,' as used in these subsections, is evidently
an organized profit-seeking venture."' 15 2 There is, of course, a strong
presumption that a word has the same meaning in different sections of the
same statute. 153 Thus he concluded that an enterprise under § 1962(c) must
also be the kind of entity in which one could invest proceeds or acquire an
interest, neither being a possibility for the terrorist organization.
Only four months after the decision in Ivic, a different panel of the Second
Circuit drastically limited it, explaining that Judge Friendly did not really mean
that a RICO enterprise need be "an organized profit-seeking venture."
Ironically this second decision, United States v. Bagaric,154 also involved
Croatian terrorists. The significant factual distinction was that the Bagaric
organization raised funds for its terrorist objectives by extorting money from
wealthy Croatians in the United States.'55 In language seemingly designed
to skirt the issue of whether the organization was an enterprise for RICO
purposes, the Bagaric court provided the following strained reading of the Ivic
precedent:
States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116-17 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States
v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1263-67 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
149. 700 F.2d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1983).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
151. Id. § 1962(b).
152. 700 F.2d at 60. The court also referred to the title of RICO, and observed that it would strain
ordinary meaning to describe the Croatian terrorist group as "corrupt" or "racketeer influenced." Id. at 61.
153. Id. at 60. Cunningham's colleague, Kathleen Brickey (an expert on white-collar crime), has
pointed out to us that Judge Friendly's textual argument ignores the full text of § 1962(a) and (b). Section
1962(a) also prohibits using income received from racketeering activity for "the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise." Section 1962(b) also prohibits using a pattern of racketeering activity to "maintain...
control of any enterprise." These broader prohibitions would seem applicable to noncommercial entities.
154. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983).
155. See 706 F.2d at 48-50.
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The Ivic court nowhere stated, however, that economic gain must be
the sole motive of every RICO enterprise.... The literal terms of the
narrow Ivic holding require no more than an objective appraisal that
some economic purpose was to be accomplished by the crime
charged .... We recognize that, read in isolation, language in Ivic
can be taken to support a requirement that, quite apart from the nature
of the predicate acts, the enterprise itself must be "the sort of entity
one joins to make money.". . . [T]his language is dictum, and differs
from the holding of the case, which stated only that because neither
the acts charged nor the purpose of the enterprise was economic, the
indictment was outside the scope of § 1962(c). More significantly, the
context in which it was employed persuades us the panel had no
intention of insisting the necessary showing of economic purpose be
confined to the enterprise .... The Ivic panel's consideration of the
meaning of "enterprise" in subsections (a) and (b) therefore amounted
to no more than support for its ultimate conclusion that economic
purpose must be shown in either the proof of enterprise or the proof
of predicate acts.
56
The court thus concluded that the RICO indictment was proper because this
Croatian organization had a financial purpose for its racketeering activity,
specifically, to raise money by extortion. A third case from the Second Circuit,
United States v. Ferguson,'5 7 followed the lead of Bagaric to uphold a RICO
conviction where the alleged enterprise was a black nationalist organization.
In Ferguson, the fact that the racketeering activities were bank robberies to
support the organization's political activities supplied the "economic element."
Neither Bagaric nor Ferguson came to terms with the impact of their facts
on the underlying textual rationale for Ivic. Neither the Bagaric nor Ferguson
organizations were entities in which one could invest proceeds or acquire an
interest; they certainly were not "organized profit-seeking ventures." Yet if
these organizations were not deemed to be enterprises, then the RICO claims
fail, regardless of how economically motivated the racketeering activities were.
There exists in the RICO case law another definition of enterprise which
can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Turkette:
The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct.... The "enterprise" is not the "pattern of racketeering
activity"; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity
in which it engages.
158
Under the Turkette definition, PLAN would be an enterprise. Indeed, a
women's health center successfully alleged that a more loosely knit pro-life
156. Id. at 53, 55, 56-57.
157. 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 841, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985).
158. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
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organization was a RICO enterprise in a Third Circuit case, Northeast
Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle.t59 McMonagle and NOW do not
technically represent a split in authority because the RICO defendants in
McMonagle did not object to the broader Turkette definition. Indeed, the
Turkette definition can be found in many of the same opinions that quote
Anderson, as if the two were interchangeable, although Anderson is obviously
narrower.
The fact that the Anderson definition is so widely and uncritically
accepted, even though the subsequent Second Circuit decisions have shorn
away Ivic's textual justification, and even in contexts in which it does not
seem applicable to the facts, suggests that the definition reflects some kind of
ordinary language intuition. 60
The linguists designed two empirical projects to explore the ordinary
language meaning of enterprise as it might be relevant to the NOW case. Their
focus was particularly on the extent to which the Anderson definition of
enterprise conformed to ordinary language usage. One project, using surveys
data, particularly addressed the "hard cases" for interpreting enterprise:
nonbusiness organizations such as labor unions, government agencies, and
politically motivated organizations that resemble PLAN or the Bagaric terrorist
group. This research, described below, produced the conclusion that, in contrast
to the Seventh Circuit's view, enterprise cannot be taken as synonymous with
business. To the contrary, while enterprise stereotypically refers to businesses,
businesses are actually a subcategory of a larger set of entities that can be
described as enterprises in ordinary usage. Moreover, deciding whether PLAN
is an enterprise is made unexpectedly difficult because, as indicated by our
survey data, English speakers divide into two groups as to how they
understand the word enterprise and thus in how they apply the word to a given
entity. One way focuses on whether the activity of the enterprise is organized
for the achievement of a goal to which the constituent members are jointly
committed; the other focuses on whether the entity is like a business. These
two ways correspond closely to the "competing" Turkette and Anderson
definitions of enterprise.
159. 868 F.2d 1342, 1348 n.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1050
(1990) (The jury was given the following definition of enterprise: "an ongoing organization, either formal
or informal in nature in which the various associates functioned as a continuing unit. The enterprise must
have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages."). This definition
actually requires less of a "common purpose" than the definition set forth in Turkette.
160. The Anderson definition may have been given particular credence by its adoption in a set of
guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1981 to guide prosecutorial discretion in
bringing RICO charges. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 64. The Justice Department has since disavowed this
interpretation. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17, NOW, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994) (No. 92-780).
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1. Searching the Range of Uses: The NEXIS Database
In their research on the ordinary meaning of enterprise, the linguists first
performed a search of the NEXIS database produced by Mead Data Central for
actual documented uses of the word in natural language. The purpose of the
NEXIS search was to enlarge the linguists' database beyond whatever
examples might have been available by simple introspection. An initial and a
second search yielded 192 examples of the word enterprise, from both spoken
and written language samples.
61
When professionally trained linguists review large sets of data in order to
study the meaning of a single word, they bring to bear no automatic screening
devices or linguistic equivalents of Geiger counters. Rather, they utilize their
awareness of grammatical categories, semantic complexities, and other
linguistic subtleties. This includes understanding the different ways that a
single part of speech, such as a noun or verb, can be used in the grammar of
a specific language, the multidimensional nature of word meaning, the role of
context in linguistic communication, and the fact that linguistic performance
varies among individuals. All of these played a part in the analysis of the
NEXIS search product. As explained earlier, 62 the linguist's skills do not
make her more authoritative than any other native speaker, such as a judge, as
to whether any particular use of a word is appropriate. The linguist can,
however, use the NEXIS search to augment the judge's thinking about possible
uses of the word, to suggest distinctions among uses that might escape the
judge's notice due to the unconscious nature of language comprehension, and
to inform the judge of uses entirely acceptable and current in the relevant
speech community, of which the judge might not be aware.
The initial review of the data revealed first that enterprise is used in two
grammatically distinct ways: first, as a mass noun, one that normally cannot
be pluralized, such as mud or clarity, and second, as a count noun, one
denoting an entity we can count, which thus can be pluralized, as in pebbles
or qualities. The mass noun category includes the familiar expression, free
enterprise. Another mass noun use denotes a personal quality that combines
ambition with creativity, as in "[H]ard work and enterprise are also part of the
[Vietnamese] culture."'
163
161. The spoken language samples were from program transcripts of the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour
and various National Public Radio news broadcasts in 1993. The written language samples were from
January 1977 editions of the Washington Post, and October 1989 samples from the New York 7hnes, the
Sacramento Bee, the St. Petersburg 7mes, ime Magazine, and U.S. News and World Report. The actual
searching, retrieval, and word processing of these samples to highlight uses of enterprise required only a
few hours of time. Levi did most of the following analysis of these examples.
162. See supra text accompanying note 25.
163. Two other examples of the mass noun use from the NEXIS data are: "[President Ford] said of
Latin America only that 'our relations have taken on a new maturity and sense of common enterprise,"'
and "[The small mom-and-pop stores that are the foundation of American enterprise."
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The count noun uses of enterprise are the ones that are relevant to
interpreting RICO. In these uses, the noun can appropriately and readily be
pluralized, as in these NEXIS citations: "Disney, Universal Studios, and the
other tourist enterprises throughout the state" and "What evolved is a mix of
academic, scientific, and business enterprises." However, we noted that count
noun uses of enterprise can be divided into at least two distinct senses: one
which denotes an activity, and one which denotes an entity carrying out such
an activity. The first "activity" sense (enterprisea) is exemplified by these
NEXIS citations:
[M]aking and launching that many satellites will be a very expensive
enterprise.
[L]iterary history has itself become a far more complex and delicate
enterprise than it ever was before.
The second count noun sense, which denotes an entity (enterprise) carrying
out one or more activities, is exemplified by these NEXIS citations:
[The National Football League] is a curious enterprise: an intercity
alliance of 28 monopolies, blessed by Congress and invariably ruled
by fabulously rich capitalists, bound up in its own form of Socialism.
[T]he kinship [foster care] program has mushroomed beyond all
expectations into a $200 million enterprise ....
We concluded that only the enterprise' sense could be the one intended in
RICO.' 6 It is this distinction between enterprise' and enterprise' that the
RICO defendants were making in arguing that NOW quoted the wrong part,
the activity part, of Webster's definition of enterprise.1
65
The data from NEXIS demonstrate conclusively that the count noun
enterprise cannot be taken a priori as synonymous with economic enterprise
where economic is taken to mean "profit-seeking." There are too many
counterexamples in the data to support any such equivalence.' 66 Moreover,
164. This conclusion follows from the fact that the definition of enterprise in RICO, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4), actually mentions specific kinds of entities--including legal ones such as corporations, as well
as other groupings of people-but not activities, and thus the statutory definition simply makes no sense
in relation to either the mass noun or enterprise' uses of enterprise. Similarly, the language of § 1962(c)
requires that we interpret the enterprise in question as some kind of entity capable of having "activities"
and conducting its "affairs." It makes no sense to speak of an activity "the activities of which" do
something.
165. See supra text accompanying note 137.
166. These counter-examples include references to entities in several subcategories such as academic,
artistic, educational, journalistic, political, religious, and scientific. Examples include (with emphasis added):
Sensing its own lure, Princeton University acquired 850 acres from the Rockefeller Medical
Institute in 1951 and transformed them into the Forrestal Campus. What has evolved is a mix
of academic, scientific and business enterprises.
When we live in a society that tries to ban books like The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,
condemns student enterprises like Not For Profit (an underground high school paper which tried
to discuss issues deeper than glorify "the car of the month") and crushes students who try to
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there are eleven occurrences of the expressions business enterprise, commercial
enterprise, and economic enterprise. These occurrences, which do not appear
to be redundant, also provide evidence for the nonsynonymous relationship of
enterprise and economic enterprise, as opposed to the apparent redundancy of
commercial business or economic business.
Another conclusion we reached from reviewing the NEXIS data is that
"organized profit-seeking entities," entities which may be roughly characterized
as equivalent to what is meant by the term businesses, represent the largest
share of the entities referred to as enterprises. We further observed that a small
number of citations, not counting those that used enterprise in the context of
a RICO prosecution, showed enterprise as denoting criminal organizations or
criminal activities, thus demonstrating that use of the word is not restricted to
entities and organizations that conform to the law.167
Our final conclusion concerning the NEXIS data was that, as far as we
could tell from the contexts provided in the fifty-word quotations, for all
examples of enterprisee, the enterprise could be characterized as having a goal
of some sort, although not necessarily the goal of seeking profits. This
common feature turned out to be very significant in the responses of the
subjects to a survey designed to expand the database on the ordinary use of
enterprise one step further.
2. Looking to the Speech Community: Investigating Native Speaker
Judgments via Questionnaires
Based on the NEXIS data and previous work on descriptive lexical
semantics, 168 we then designed a survey questionnaire. We designed the
survey in part to test the Anderson definition of enterprise used by the Seventh
Circuit in NOW: "an association (1) having an ascertainable structure (2) which
exists for the purpose of maintaining operations (3) directed toward an
economic goal (4) that has an existence that can be defined apart from the
tackle the pressing issues of the day ....
[In Iraq] a monstrous political order has taken hold, an order that has grafted modern methods
of totalitarian control into an old form of Middle Eastern despotism. At the core of this
enterprise is the cult of the ruler, Saddam Hussein: the ruler as master, all-knowing, all-seeing.
For further examples of this usage of enterprise, see infra Appendix B.
167. Examples include (with emphasis added):
The National Security Council has launched an investigation to identify who is behind the
smuggling enterprise, which is now a $3 billion-a-year industry.
So far, the [New Haven] task force claims credit for destroying one gang, uncovering a major
criminal enterprise, and bringing peace to one New Haven neighborhood.
Schultz and three henchmen.., had spent the evening at a table in the back room going over
their receipts from their enterprises.
Another concern of American officials is that the traffickers might reach an accommodation in
Colombia and shift their cocaine enterprises to other South American countries.
168. Kaplan did the initial survey design and most of the analysis of survey results that appears below.
Kaplan's main source for the type of survey he designed was Linda Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype
Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57 LANGUAGE 26 (1981).
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commission of the predicate acts constituting the pattern of racketeering
activity."' 69 The survey asked subjects whether certain real or hypothetical
groups were enterprises, and contained examples written to test whether
entities similar to PLAN and the Croatian terrorist group in Bagaric would be
considered enterprises. It also asked if a well-known labor union, the United
Auto Workers, and a well-known government agency engaged in economic
activity, the Internal Revenue Service, were enterprises.
a. Methodology
The following survey question illustrates the format used for each
question:
The IBM (International Business Machines) Corporation.
(a) Does it seem right, to you, to call the International Business
Machines (IBM) an "enterprise?"
YES I CAN'T TELL NO
(b) I am
VERY SURE FAIRLY SURE NOT TOO SURE
that most others would agree with the choice I circled in
response to question (a).
We scored their combined answers on a scale from 1 to 7 as follows:
VERY SURE FAIRLY SURE NOT TOO SURE
NO 1 2 3
CAN'T TELL 4 4 4
YES 7 6 5
After several pre-tests by Kaplan at San Diego State University and by
Cunningham at Washington University, 70 we developed a final set of twelve
questions. To keep the time for survey completion short, the twelve questions
were split between two different questionnaire forms so that, in any given
survey session, half the group was answering the six questions on Survey A
and the other half the six questions on Survey B. 17' The survey was
administered three times, to students at Northwestern University, Washington
169. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358,
1372 (8th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added by the NOW court, numbers inserted by author)).
170. The authors received considerable assistance during the pre-test period from Lee Robins,
University Professor of Social Science at Washington University, who has very extensive experience in
survey research.
171. The items which appeared on the surveys are presented in full in Appendix C. In addition to six
questions regarding enterprise, each survey also contained three questions relating to the word exhibit as
part of our research on the Knox case. See supra note 2.
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University, and San Diego State University. 172 In total, there were fifty-four
respondents to Survey A and sixty-two to Survey B. The surveys given to
respondents in two of the sample groups also asked them to explain briefly
"Why or Why Not" after circling "Yes," "No," or "Can't Tell," and before
choosing among the "Very Sure," "Fairly Sure," and "Not Too Sure" options.
We subsequently mailed to 127 U.S. District Court judges a survey that
contained six examples from Surveys A and B, including those most relevant
to RICO; 173 37 judges responded. As will be shown in more detail below,
their responses corresponded with those of the college students, in particular
as to the most important examples, and thus provide convergent evidence
supporting the model of the speech community's range of uses of enterprise
derived from the original survey's responses. 74
In using surveys to explore further the meanings of enterprise, the authors
are not suggesting that judges should delegate to others the task of ascertaining
just how statutory terms should be applied to particular cases. Nor do we
suggest that legal meaning is something that can be determined by an opinion
poll. 175 Rather, as with the NEXIS data, the surveys are a device for
expanding an individual's ability to bring to conscious awareness her intuitive
understanding of word meaning, and for informing an individual of perfectly
172. At San Diego, the subjects were students in a linguistics class taught by Kaplan; at Northwestern
the subjects were students in a linguistics class taught by Levi. The Washington University subjects were
students in an undergraduate course in social methods taught by Lee Robins, see supra note 170;
Cunningham was present when the survey was administered. None of the subjects were given any
information or instructions beyond what appeared on the survey questionnaire itself. Washington University
students received Survey A and B in four different forms with question sequencing randomized on Robins'
advice; the randomizing did not seem to affect responses.
173. The survey was mailed to all active and senior status federal district court judges in Alabama,
Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, and New Mexico. The selection of states represented
a rough balance among regions of the country and between urban versus rural districts. Because the survey
was mailed from Washington University and the cover letter identified linguistics professors at
Northwestern University and the University of Illinois as part of the team designing the survey, it was
hoped that judges in Missouri and Illinois would be particularly likely to respond. Although the cover letter
to the judges did state that "the Supreme Court will hear argument on cases that require interpretation of
these words [enterprise and exhibit] in two federal statutes," no explicit reference to RICO or the NOW
case was made. Further, the judges were asked "not to answer any question based on your belief of what
the word should mean in any particular federal statute or how it should be interpreted in any pending case."
Letter to Federal Judges Re: Statutory Interpretation Project (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with Prof. Clark
Cunningham).
174. These judges were surveyed for two reasons. First, they are representative of one group that must
interpret RICO on a case by case basis, and must apply whatever definition the Court develops in deciding
the NOW case. Second, even though this project was not aimed at determining legislative intent, the authors
anticipated possible criticism that the college student respondents, although literate and thoughtful, might
be too divergent in age and life experience from the people who enacted RICO to be relevant. The district
court judges seemed to be a group that would be motivated to respond to the survey and who would more
closely approximate the age and life experience of the legislators who voted on RICO, assuming that is a
relevant factor. The authors also sent the same survey received by the judges to 146 current members of
Congress, targeting the members with the longest terms of service. Only five returned completed surveys;
six wrote letters explaining they have a policy of not answering surveys.
175. Judges should, however, take survey data very seriously in regard to whether a word or phrase
is ambiguous as a matter of ordinary language. It is very hard to maintain that a particular utterance is




acceptable and normal uses, or subtleties thereof, that a word may have in the
speech community-uses of which the individual might not previously have
been aware.
b. Results and Discussion
Tables A and B contain the average score and the standard deviation for
each response across the three groups of student subjects, along with a measure
(a two-tailed t-test) of whether the average score for each item is significantly
lower than the score of the item listed just above it. Table C displays the
results from the judges.
Of particular interest for present purposes is the fact that the example
designed to track closely the features of the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN)
as described in the NOW case 176 was the example that scored most like an
enterprise after IBM and the Small Company. This example was in a statistical
tie for first place with three other entries in the judges' survey.'7 7 The survey
described the PLAN-type example as follows:
The Coalition for Fair Adoption Laws (CFAL) is a highly organized
national network of non-profit organizations representing adoptive
parents and persons seeking to adopt. The executive directors of the
member organizations comprise the steering committee of CFAL.
CFAL's activities include lobbying, rallies, and planning
demonstrations at courts and adoption agencies.
176. PLAN is a highly organized nationwide network of anti-abortion activists; its "steering
committee" is comprised of the executive directors of several member organizations. PLAN is responsible
for the overall national strategy of national conferences and training sessions, promotion of national
agendas, and direct action against abortion clinics. Brief of Petitioners at 7, NOW, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994)
(No. 92-780). PLAN raises funds which support staff salaries, office expenses, and other operational costs.
Id. at 47.
177. The judges' survey did not include either the IBM or Small Company questions. See infra
Appendix C.
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TABLE A. Survey A (54 University Students)
Question Average Standard Difference
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TABLE B. Survey B (62 University Students)
Question Average Standard Difference
(1:NoNery Sure to Score Deviation Statistically
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TABLE C. Survey C (37 District Court Judges)
Question Average Standard Difference
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The CFAL results were notable not only for the high scores but also for the
distribution of answers. Specifically, 70% of the student respondents and 66%
of the judges were either very sure or fairly sure that others would agree with
their judgment about whether CFAL was or was not an enterprise.17 The
average scores of 4.7 for students and 4.8 for judges are thus primarily the
result of offsetting high and low scores, 179 rather than a high number of "I
Can't Tell" responses. Graphs 1 and 2 most accurately display this distribution.
Also of particular interest for RICO purposes was the scoring of the
Independent Quebec Organization (IQO), an entity designed to track the
features of the Croatian terrorist group that the Second Circuit found to be an
enterprise in Bagaric: "The Independent Quebec Organization is a terrorist
group that robs banks and extorts money from wealthy, French-speaking
Canadians to finance its bombing, arson, and assassination activities." The
students rated IQO significantly lower than CFAL, but the judges rated IQO
relatively high.' Graphs 3 and 4 show the distribution of scores for this
item.
178. From this point forward, we will refer to respondents "being sure" about a particular judgment
rather than fully stating that they were sure that others would agree. We adopted the seven point scale from
the Coleman and Kay experiment mentioned above. Coleman & Kay, supra note 168. Coleman and Kay
actually sought to discover the respondent's strength of conviction in her own judgment but found in a
pretest that subjects seemed to circle "I am very sure" despite other indicators, such as long hesitation and
facial gestures during testing, that seemed to indicate uncertainty. Id. at 30. Thus they reformulated the
"sure" question to ask about whether others would agree in order to investigate indirectly the subject's own
certainty. For our purposes, certainty that others would agree with the subject's own judgment is if anything
a more significant indicator of speech community usage than the speaker's personal conviction of certainty.
179. Among the students, 50% were either very sure or fairly sure that CFAL was an enterprise, while
20% were either very sure or fairly sure it was not. Among the judges, 54% were either very sure or fairly
sure that it was an enterprise, 11.5% were very sure or fairly sure it was not.
180. For the judges' survey, the differences between the average score for IQO and the average scores
for CFAL, UAWV, and Lemonade Stand were not statistically significant according to the two-tailed t-test,
as indicated by the "p value" column in Table C. Nonetheless, the authors are intrigued by the difference
in distribution of scores for IQO between the students and the judges as displayed in graphs 3 and 4. Eight
subjects in the San Diego State and Washington University surveys (the two groups asked to explain "Why
or Why Not" they answered as they did) provided explanations for answering "No" as to IQO. Six out of
these eight explained that IQO is "not legal" or engages in "negative activities." We speculate that the
judges (who were not asked in their survey to provide explanations) were accustomed to the concept of a
"criminal enterprise," and thus were not dissuaded to the same degree by the illegal nature of IQO's
activities. In the same vein, it is possible that some of the judges were familiar with the Bagaric precedent,
and thus readily identified IQO as a RICO enterprise, despite the instructions not to interpret enterprise for
purposes of any particular statute.
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A highly structured legal organization devoted to raising money, the
Internal Revenue Service, rated low for both students and judges. Twice as
many student respondents said "No" with at least fair certainty than said
"Yes." Even more strikingly, 70% of the judges said "No" with at least fair
certainty as contrasted with only 6% saying "Yes" with such certainty.
On the basis of these results, it can be concluded that the Anderson
definition used by the Seventh Circuit to dismiss NOW's RICO claim does not
correspond well with the way most speakers understand enterprise, since an
overwhelming majority of both the students and judges responding thought that
at least one entity was an enterprise that lacked at least one of the elements of
that definition: economic goal, ascertainable structure, and independent
existence. CFAL received an average rating of 4.7 from the students and 4.8
from the judges, despite having no economic goal, about the same as
Lemonade Stand which rated 4.69 from the students and 4.66 from the judges.
Lemonade Stand does have an economic goal but has minimal structure and
no existence independent of the momentary activity.'8 ' Moreover, the
implicit fund-raising activities of the IRS were not sufficient to earn it an
average rating close to that of CFAL.8 2 Indeed, nothing in the Anderson
definition of enterprise can explain why such a highly structured and
independently existing entity as the IRS was rated so much lower than CFAL.
Respondents' answers to the Why/Why Not questions helped to explain the
striking results. The subjects divided into two distinct, albeit related, groups in
regard to the primary criterion for categorizing an entity as an enterprise. The
first group centered on the entity's having a clear goal, while the second group
focused on one very specific goal, seeking a profit.
3
The subjects' explanations of why they rated CFAL as they did
demonstrate this bifurcated pattern. Of the twelve respondents who provided
Why/Why Not answers and felt that CFAL was an enterprise, all but two
mentioned the organization having a goal.' 8" In sharp contrast, all five of the
181. The Lemonade Stand was described simply as "Three children selling lemonade on a street
corner." See infra Appendix C.
182. The IRS received an average rating of 3.96 from the students and only 2.4 from the judges.
183. The split between these two approaches can be seen in several ways in the Why/Why Not
responses. A tally of all the properties of enterprise that subjects mentioned shows that 65% mentioned
"seeking a profit" and 54% mentioned "having a goal." In this count, the number mentioning the latter does
not include subjects mentioning the former, although seeking a profit is a kind of goal. Other properties
were mentioned by far fewer subjects. For example, 25.5% mentioned "having group unity," 22%
mentioned "having official status," and only 16% mentioned "having structure." Moreover, only 4% of the
subjects who provided Why/Why Not responses failed to mention either "seeking a profit" or "having a
goal"; 41% mentioned profit but not goal, 31% mentioned goal but not profit, and 24% mentioned both.
For further discussion of these responses, see infra Appendix E.
184. The two who did not mention goal said: "Maybe not because is non-profit group" and "They are
all working together." The former comment was apparently an explanation of why the subject was "Not
Too Sure" others would agree with his answer rather than of why the subject thought CFAL was an
enterprise. The latter explanation could arguably be understood as implying a goal.
1608 [Vol. 103: 1561
Plain Meaning
"No" respondents who disagreed and explained why CFAL was not an
enterprise mentioned CFAT's lack of an economic goal.
As one might have expected, respondents' explanations for their ratings of
the Movement for Fair Adoption Laws (MFAL), an entity designed to be
similar to CFAL but less structured, 8 5 show the same pattern as seen in the
CFAL responses, namely the contrast between "having a goal" and "seeking
a profit" as the primary criterion. 86 One "Can't Tell" respondent explicitly
stated the clear tension between "goal" and "profit-seeking": "It's very possible
that having a large group of people working together for a common purpose
is an enterprise, but I tend to think that enterprises make money."
An examination of the explanations for the UAW, the IRS, and the IQO
shows that the "goal" versus "profit-seeking" dichotomy drives those responses
as well, but with a difference that strongly suggests why CFAL and MFAL
produced fewer "Can't Tell" and more "sure" responses in both directions.
CFAL and MFAL had very clearly identified goals that defined the
organizations, and they were also clearly not motivated by making money. As
a result, respondents who weighed the "goal" feature heavily felt sure that they
were enterprises, and those who thought an enterprise needed to be profit-
seeking were sure that they were not. The relative few who marked "Can't
Tell" seemed to feel an equal pull from both features and were thus
immobilized by the sharp choice that CFAL and MFAL offered between them.
In contrast, the relatively strong showing for UAW shows about half the
affirmative votes coming from those who weigh goal-orientation heavily and
thought the UAW has a clear goal, and the rest from people who thought the
UAW makes money or is otherwise like a business. The "Yes" responses to
IQO show the same pattern. The IRS, in contrast, rated much lower because
very few of the "goal" weighing respondents thought it had a clear goal; the
relatively few "Yes" explanations' 87 emphasized its money-raising function.
In brief, among those respondents who expressed a reason for answering
any of the questions, there was almost total correlation between whether the
respondent preferred a "goal" or "profit-seeking" explanation and how the
respondent decided the "hard" cases.
It is possible to contrast the "profit-seeking" and "goal" ways of
understanding enterprise by considering two different ways that people might
185. MFAL was described as "an unstructured network of political activists, who favor freer adoption.
With much intercommunication among 'members,' MFAL's activities consist of, among other things,
planning demonstrations at courts and adoption agencies." See infra Appendix C.
186. Of the fourteen respondents who indicated that MFAL was an enterprise and explained their
answer, eleven referred to MFAL's having a goal. Of the six respondents who said MFAL was not an
enterprise and explained why, two mentioned that it lacked a profit-making focus, two mentioned that it
lacked structure, and two gave essentially "empty" explanations. Those two explanations were: (1) "Think
of enterprise as something else" and (2) "I have only heard the word 'enterprise' to describe inanimate
things."
187. Almost no one was "very sure" that the IRS was an enterprise.
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decide whether to apply the familiar word enterprise to an unfamiliar entity
such as the (hypothetical) Coalition for Fair Adoption Laws. One way is to
think about enterprise-as-entity, and then compare CFAL to the stereotypical
enterprise-as-entity, namely a business. This way could produce the kind of
rankings given by the "seeking a profit" group. The "have a goal" group could
have proceeded differently, by focusing on enterprise-as-activity, even though
the examples were all entities.
The two conceptions of an enterprise as a goal-directed activity and as a
goal-directed entity correspond to a more general relation between an activity
and concrete manifestations of that activity, as Green has discussed in detail
elsewhere.' 88 Thus English speakers use and understand constitution as either
a process of constituting or a written charter that constitutes a nation or
organization, and shelter as the state of being sheltered, as in "Shelter is a
basic human need," or as a structure that enables that state, as in "Shelter is
expensive. ' " This process may be at work for those who used the "goal"
way of understanding enterprise: the respondent relates the novel entity to the
activity in which it apparently engages, and then compares that activity to
familiar enterprise activities, which generally have clear goals, though not
necessarily profit-seeking goals.
The survey work generates several conclusions. First, disagreement among
members of the same speech community, for both the students and the judges,
over whether a given entity is an enterprise is not entirely attributable to what
Solan terms "categorical indeterminacy" or "fuzzy words." Rather for some
examples, most notably CFAL, most speakers who disagree about whether the
example is an enterprise agree that the issue is not "fuzzy." They feel sure that
most others would agree with their own conclusion about membership in the
category. The relatively few "Can't Tell" responses for such examples further
suggest that the interpretive challenge is not a problem of marginal
membership in a category.' 90
Second, this disagreement is not a result of speakers choosing between two
meanings which all speakers use, as is the case of homonym pairs like bank
as the land edge next to a river and bank as a financial institution. Rather,
speakers differ in how they apply enterprise to entities. One group looks at
whether an entity has a clear goal; the other asks whether the entity is like a
business.
Third, for the many who use "having a goal" as their primary criterion, the
word enterprise may denote both "economic," profit-seeking enterprises and
188. See, e.g., GREEN, PRAGMATICS, supra note 6, at 47-61.
189. Another example of a relation between a state of affairs and the entities whose properties
constitute it is seen in the following two sentences: "Snow is forecast for tomorrow," and "Snow is cold."
The word snow is used quite unremarkably to refer to either a process or the concrete manifestation of that
process.
190. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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noneconomic enterprises. For this substantial part of the speech community,
whether a nonbusiness entity is an enterprise does not turn on the degree to
which the goal is economic. Rather, for such persons, the clarity of its goal
and the extent to which the entity is identified with that goal is more salient.
Fourth, it is only for that part of the speech community which uses "profit-
seeking" as the primary criterion that the economic character of the entity's
goal is salient. However, even for this group, the other features of the
Anderson definition-ascertainable structure and independent existence--do not
state necessary conditions for being an enterprise, as demonstrated by the
number who are sure that Lemonade Stand is an enterprise.
Fifth, because of these conclusions, reasonable members of the speech
community can and do differ as to whether they consider a goal-oriented but
non-profit-seeking entity such as PLAN to be an enterprise.
Sixth, businesses are the stereotypical enterprises for both groups.
However, this does not mean that business and enterprise are synonymous, any
more than the fact that Americans consider a robin to be a stereotypical bird
means they believe that the word robin is a synonym of bird.
These results, along with those from the NEXIS search, give rise to the
following implications for the NOW case. Many if not most speakers would
consider describing PLAN as an enterprise to be an appropriate use of the
word, although some speakers would disagree with certainty. People who
identify an enterprise primarily by its clear goals would classify PLAN as an
enterprise, because it has a clear and specific goal; the activities it generates
to accomplish that goal readily meet their understanding of enterprising
activities;' 91 and it is an organizational embodiment of its goal-directed
activity. For these persons, PLAN's clear commitment to a specific goal is
likely to make it seem as much or more like an enterprise as entities like
terrorist groups, labor unions, and government agencies.
On the other hand, for people who apply an economic criterion in deciding
whether an entity is an enterprise, PLAN will probably not qualify because its
economic activities are so incidental to its organizational goals that it does not
significantly resemble a profit-seeking business. However, such people may
also conclude that terrorist groups, labor unions, and government agencies are
not enterprises because they too do not seem enough like businesses.
Both groups appear to treat "having a goal" as essential, though they differ
in whether that goal must be an economic one. In fact, the two ways of
interpreting enterprise that have emerged from our empirical research
correspond closely to the "competing" Turkette and Anderson definitions of
enterprise. Thus the circuit splits appear to reflect actual features of ordinary
language usage, which may do much to explain the origin and persistence of
both definitions, including the unreflective way courts use each in the case law.
191. See supra p. 1597.
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The larger statutory context in which enterprise appears in RICO seems
to point in both directions. As recognized in Ivic, the "business-like" or
"economic goal" criterion seems relevant to the first two of RICO's three
prohibitions: § 1962(a) prohibits investment in an enterprise and § 1962(b)
prohibits acquiring an interest in an enterprise. 92 On the other hand, a fair
interpretation of the statute's definitional subsection on enterprise, with its
"includes" phrasing, is that Congress intended to expand the meaning of
enterprise in RICO beyond businesses. 93 In particular there is little doubt
that Congress intended to protect labor unions from racketeering influence and
corruption; textual evidence to that effect in both the mention of unions in the
definition of enterprise194 and the inclusion of labor unions in conjunction
with businesses in the preamble to the Act.' 95 Yet, at least according to our
survey data, the "business-like" criterion does not readily lead to the
conclusion that unions such as the UAW are enterprises.
96
The lessons from the linguists' analysis and the tangled case law seem to
merge. Some speakers, thinking of a business as the stereotypical enterprise,
will apply the word to entities whose primary goal is profit. However, such a
meaning of enterprise excludes a wide range of entities regularly, and
according to many speakers properly, called enterprises. Inclusion of this wider
range of entities entails replacing the narrow "business-like" criterion with a
broader criterion that focuses on whether the entity is dedicated to a clear,
specific goal. Courts attempting to retain the narrow focus on economic goal
while at the same time including nonbusiness organizations such as PLAN,
terrorist groups, labor unions, or government agencies within the definition of
enterprise run counter to the ordinary language patterns of usage and are likely
to generate incoherent discourse.
The linguistic analysis we have presented of course is not offered as a
"right answer" to how the NOW case should be decided. The role of linguists
has been to analyze the language, not to make judicial decisions about the
legal implications of such analysis. Rather the analysis has shown that both the
Anderson and Turkette definitions have roots in ordinary language. Further,
there can be a host of sound legal reasons why enterprise should have a
different meaning in RICO than in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the
analysis by linguists could help judges articulate their own intuitions about
how the word enterprise is ordinarily used, and at the same time show judges
what the range of uses of this word appears to be in the speech community.
192. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. However, as discussed in note 153, Ivic may be
reading § 1962(a) and (b) too narrowly as applying only to business-like entities.
193. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
195. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
196. Consider the following Why/Why Not explanations from respondents who said the UAW is not
an enterprise: "they're workers, not a business," "this group does not seek financial gain," "not making
money primarily," and "they don't work together or cooperate to make money for themselves."
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Both of these contributions could help a judge understand how other judges
might come to different conclusions about what this word "plainly means."
The discourse between those disagreeing judges could then rise above mere
unarticulated assertion of personal understanding or invocation of a
strategically chosen dictionary edition. Instead it could become informed by
such objectively derived distinctions as those between activities and entities
and between the "goal" and "profit-seeking" criteria for deciding whether a
nonbusiness organization is an enterprise.
To the extent that a court's opinion explicitly selected one of these two
criteria, subsequent applications of that opinion to new cases might be more
coherent and predictable because the actual rationale would be seen clearly,
and the unjustified claims that "ordinary language" simply dictates a single
result would not be present. However, even if the language of RICO is not so
plain as to dictate a single result, its language can still guide judicial
decisionmaking: for even in a case that apparently presented what Solan views
as an intractable problem of fuzzy category boundaries, analysis of ordinary
language meaning does provide a degree of determinacy through identifying
and articulating these two distinct criteria. In this way, an empirical study by
trained language analysts can help untangle the linguistic knots that led to
NOW becoming a "hard" case.'97
197. On January 24, 1994, less than seven weeks after oral argument, the Court issued a unanimous
decision in favor of NOW; Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the brief opinion. 114 S. Ct. 798, 798-806
(1994). Justice Souter wrote a one page concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, emphasizing that the
decision did not address whether the abortion protesters might have some First Amendment defense to a
RICO suit. Id. at 806-07.
The Court's quick unanimous decision and its terse opinion refuted expectations that the highly
politicized nature of the underlying abortion protest issue, an element which made the case one of the most
publicized of the term to date, would produce a lengthy and splintered set of opinions. The NOW case
makes a striking contrast with last term's decision in Bray v. Alexandria 'Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.
Ct. 753 (1993) (the "Operation Rescue" case), also brought by NOW and abortion clinics against anti-
abortion protesters, but under the anticonspiracy provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3). Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Bray, holding that NOW did not have a cause of action, was
one of five opinions produced by the fractured Court-all totalling 49 pages in the Supreme Court Reporter.
The content of the NOW opinion itself, along with the swiftness, unanimity, and brevity of the
decision, indicate that the Justices' reliance on their own linguistic intuitions about the "plain meaning" of
enterprise may have been a most significant factor. The key to Rehnquist's opinion appears to be the
presupposition that enterprise as used in ordinary language is appropriately applied to PLAN. This
presupposition is apparent in statements that begin and end the substantive discussion in the opinion: "We
turn to the question of whether the racketeering enterprise or the racketeering predicate acts must be
accompanied by an underlying economic motive," 114 S. Ct. at 803 (emphasis added), and "the question
presented for review asked simply whether the Court should create an unwritten requirement limiting RICO
to cases where either the enterprise or racketeering activity has an overriding economic motive." Id. at 806
n.6 (emphasis added). Rehnquist is able to agree with NOW's characterization of the economic motive
requirement as "unwritten" because he takes as self-evident that the meaning of enterprise does not contain
such a requirement. His opinion focuses instead on whether the text of RICO contains other evidence of
an economic motive requirement. Rehnquist finds only two provisions deserving of attention. The first is
the requirement in § 1962(c), the provision that NOW accused the abortion protestors of violating, that the
enterprise "affect commerce." See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Rehnquist rejects this as a
possible textual basis for an economic motive requirement by citing a dictionary definition of "affect" for
the conclusion that an enterprise could affect commerce without being profit-seeking. 114 S. Ct. at 804
(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEWv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (1969)). The second possibility rejected
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Meaning Cannot Be Found in "The" Dictionary
As we received comments on prior drafts of this essay, we were struck by
how often law-trained reviewers asked some version of the following question:
"So how is this analysis really any better than just looking in the dictionary?"
A superficial answer would be to point to the variance in the definition of
enterprise among leading dictionaries discussed above in connection with the
NOW case. Moreover, there is no single reference book which is The
Dictionary, but rather a number of competing publications which themselves
may differ significantly from edition to edition. Law currently has no rule for
identifying only one publisher's edition as The Dictionary, nor is there likely
to be a principled basis for such a rule.' But the value of linguistics goes
well beyond the fact that it could address the problem of inconsistency among
dictionaries as to a particular word definition. Linguistics is not properly seen
as a means of supplementing the information provided by dictionaries about
word meaning. In fact, linguists do not view dictionaries of their own language
as significant primary sources and are unlikely to consult them for guidance
in doing their research on word meaning.
We would offer the following additional points as reasons why empirical
research is likely to be more informative and reliable than simple recourse to
a dictionary:
(1) Dictionaries do not represent facts of a language that are independent
of the users of that language. Dictionaries do not legislate usage; if a particular
actual usage does not conform with a dictionary's description, it does not
follow that the usage is therefore incorrect.'99
by the Court is the language in § 1962(a) and (b), discussed in the Ivic case. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988)
(prohibiting investment of racketeering income in an enterprise); Id. § 1962(b) (prohibiting acquisition of
interest in or control of an enterprise through racketeering activity); see supra notes 149-51 and
accompanying text. Rehnquist concludes that the role of the enterprise entity. in § 1962(a) and (b)-as
victim of racketeering activity-is significantly different than its role in § 1962(c)-as instrument or
perpetrator of racketeering. Id. at 804. The opinion ends by summarily dismissing appeals to legislative
history and the rule of lenity with statements that "we believe" and "we think" that the statutory language
is unambiguous. Id. at 805-06.
Contrary to our assertion in the sentence preceding this note in the text, the Court's opinion conveys
the general impression that NOW was in fact not a hard case at all. All nine Justices thus appear to fall
within the group of speakers, represented by the majority of both student and district judge survey
respondents, who consider entities with a clear goal to be enterprises, regardless of economic motive, and
believe that others share that understanding.
198. The situation would be different, though still problematic, if a convention existed that all
lawmakers-legislators, regulation promulgators, and judges alike-would routinely and exclusively refer
only to a specified dictionary edition, so that for example the Court in deciding the NOW case could
assume with confidence that the 1970 judiciary committees of both Houses had consulted the second edition
of Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary before deciding to use enterprise as a key term in drafting
RICO.
199. The authors expect that readers of this essay have shared their experience of looking up a word
in a dictionary to find that none of the definitions match the particular use they have in mind. That
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(2) The fact that a meaning is listed in a dictionary is just evidence that
the dictionary makers (lexicographers) observed the word being used in a way
consistent with it having that meaning intended."' Nothing can validly be
inferred from the fact that a particular meaning is not recorded for a particular
word. Dictionary-making is an inexact art, and it often happens that usages are
common for some time before lexicographers happen to collect enough of them
and realize that they represent a distinct usage, and decide to revise an entry
to include that usage.20' In contrast, empirical means for enlarging one's
database such as the NEXIS search or surveys used for analyzing enterprise
are far more reliable means of observing and testing contemporary usage.202
(3) Even when a dictionary does record a usage that corresponds to what
appears to be a legally relevant meaning, it is dangerous to rely on the way
that usage is characterized, categorized, and ordered. Dictionary entries are
severely limited by time and space constraints; lexicographers must prepare
thousands of dictionary entries, each one of which must fit into a very small
space and predetermined format. Whether a particular usage is listed first or
last in an entry has no bearing on whether it is the "plainest" meaning for the
word in the context in question.2 3 Thus even if a dictionary accurately
records and distinguishes among relevant usages, analysis by a linguist would
provide much needed guidance for choosing among the different dictionary
entries by discovering the use conditions pertinent to each entry.2"
(4) Dictionaries must provide definitions that are appropriate to thousands
of contexts; a linguist can conduct a study in a case-specific context, thereby
drawing upon whatever aspects of the context that are likely to be pertinent to
readers of that language in that context.
Of course, the different kinds of language issues that arise in hard cases
often require other kinds of linguistic expertise than that needed for
interpretation of individual word meaning; such cases thus lie entirely beyond
experience does not mean, though, that the particular use is inappropriate. Green found that in 17 randomly
selected passages of English narrative prose, an average of 14% of the uses of nouns, verbs, and adjectives
were not listed in a selection of desktop dictionaries. For an earlier survey of narrative prose, see GREEN,
PRAGMATICS, supra note 6, at 56 n.17.
200. See generally SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY
(1984).
201. Not only are dictionaries unreliable as evidence of new but accepted usage, but they are also
likely to preserve usages that have become archaic without necessarily so indicating.
202. For example, none of the dictionaries we reviewed clearly listed a definition that would cover
noneconomic enterprise entities (as distinct from noneconomic enterprise activities) even though both the
NEXIS and survey data show clearly that such usages of enterprise are acceptable in contemporary
American English.
203. The principles of arranging the glosses ("definitions") varies from dictionary to dictionary;
sometimes it is historical or chronological order. It might be by inferred frequency, or it might be by some
logical schema. Generally the front matter of the dictionary will explain how entries are structured.
204. For example, the use of enterprise that Webster's Third International Dictionary defines as
"readiness to attempt" can be readily distinguished by a linguist from enterprise as "venture, undertaking"
by the fact that the former appears in actual use as a mass noun while the latter is used a count noun. See
supra text accompanying note 163.
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the competence of either dictionaries or dictionary makers. Within the scope
of this essay alone, we have seen that hard cases can arise from the ways
words interact with each other in a particular context, such as the opaque
context problem discussed in the Staples case, or from the relation of an
utterance to the context of its uttering, such as the nonexistent referent of the
original sentence in the Granderson case. In such cases that go well beyond
individual word meaning, the specific interpretive problems can be carefully
matched to individual subfields of linguistics in ways that are simply
unavailable to users of dictionaries. Linguists with expertise in those areas
could then provide focused and informed analyses of the language issues in
question.205
B. Navigating Uncertainty
It will probably be difficult to dislodge the grip the lawyer or judge has
upon the dictionary of his or her choice, both because legal discourse requires
constant invocation of authority and because a number of procedural problems
arise once the fiction is dissolved that meaning can be "judicially noticed" by
pulling a dictionary off the shelf. The very flexibility of language that Solan
rightly celebrates is possible precisely because the range of meaning of a word
or sentence cannot be limited in advance by prescription but rather is realized
in the creativity of actual use. Interpretation of actual usage is thus very
complex but also achievable. Perhaps the greatest virtue of Justice Scalia's
reformulation of the plain meaning rule is the implicit recognition that "plain
meaning" does not necessarily mean "simple" or "determinate" meaning.
Indeterminacy does not equate with vacuity of meaning; indeed, as the
analyses in this essay show, meaning is frequently indeterminate because a
word or phrase can mean so many different things. The challenge in such
circumstances is not to attempt to create new meaning in a vacuum but to
select among objectively identifiable options in a principled way that produces
a coherent discourse.
In a felicitous metaphor, James Boyd White offers this advice to those
unsettled by the indeterminacy of legal language: When what seemed to be
solid ground becomes water under your feet shifting with every breeze, don't
205. Further, the value of linguistics for the judicial process cannot be judged fully from the three
Supreme Court cases analyzed by us and the handful of other cases we discuss from Solan's book, not only
because linguistics encompasses a wider range of areas of language study than that upon which we have
drawn here, but also because the range of hard cases centering on language issues is of course vastly
underrepresented by the cases discussed in this essay. For a report on how a fuller array of linguistic
subfields has been applied at the trial level through expert testimony, see Judith N. Levi, Language as
Evidence: The Linguist as Expert Mtness in North American Courts, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS (forthcoming
Spring 1994).
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sink or drift aimlessly: learn to sail 2 6 For those willing to sail,
linguistics-like a telescope-may reveal a few more stars by which to steer.
206. See JAMES B. VHrrE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 278 (1984).
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APPENDIX A. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS OF ENTERPRISE 07
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 563
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1987):
1. An undertaking, especially of some scope, complication, and risk.
2. a. Commercial or economic activity; business: private enterprise.
b. A business or company. 3. Industrious effort, especially when
directed toward making money. 4. Readiness to venture; boldness;
initiative.
FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW "STANDARD" DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 828 (Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1959):
1. That which one attempts to perform; any projected task or work
upon which one sets out; an undertaking; scheme, especially, a bold
or difficult undertaking; 2. The act of engaging, or the disposition to
engage, in difficult undertakings; boldness, energy, and invention
exhibited in practical affairs, especially in business.
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 293 (2d ed. Clarendon Press 1989):
1. A design of which the execution is attempted; a piece of work
taken in hand, an undertaking; chiefly, and now exclusively, a bold,
arduous, or momentous undertaking. b. abstr. Engagement in such
undertakings. 2. Disposition or readiness to engage in undertakings of
difficulty, risk, or danger; daring spirit. 3. The action of taking in
hand; management, superintendence. Obs.
3 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY 476 (Clarendon Press
1991):
1 an undertaking, esp. a bold or difficult one. 2 (as a personal
attribute) readiness to engage in such undertakings. 3 a business firm.
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 476 (Random
House 1966):
1. a project undertaken or to be undertaken, esp. one that is of some
importance or that requires boldness or energy. 2. a plan for such a
207. Etymology and examples of usage omitted.
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project. 3. participation or engagement in such projects. 4. boldness
or readiness in undertaking; adventurous spirit; energy. 5. a company
organized for commercial purposes; business firm. Syn 1. plan,
undertaking, venture.
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE-UNABRIDGED 606 (2d ed. The World Publishing Co. 1961):
1. an undertaking; a project.
2. a bold, hard, dangerous, or important undertaking.
3. willingness to venture on such undertakings; readiness to take risks
or try something untried; energy and initiative.
4. the carrying on of projects; participation in undertakings.
Syn.-adventure, undertaking, venture.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 484
(World Publishing Co. 1968):
1. an undertaking; project; hence, 2. a bold, hard, dangerous, or
important undertaking. 3. willingness to venture on such undertakings;
readiness to take risks or try something untried; energy and initiative.
4. the carrying on of projects; participation in undertakings.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE-UNABRIDGED 757 (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1986):
1 a: a plan or design for a venture or undertaking. b: VENTURE,
UNDERTAKING, PROJECT; esp: an undertaking that is difficult,
complicated, or has a strong element of risk. c: a unit of economic
organization or activity (as a factory, a farm, a mine); esp: a business
organization: FIRM, COMPANY. d: any systematic purposeful
activity or type of activity. 2: readiness to attempt or engage in what
requires daring or energy : a bold energetic questing spirit
independence of thought : INITIATIVE, ENERGY.
THE WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 705 (World Book, Inc. 1988):
1. an important, difficult, or dangerous plan to be tried; great or bold
undertaking. 2. any undertaking; project: a business enterprise. 3.
readiness to start projects; willingness to undertake great or bold
projects: 4. The carrying on of enterprises; a taking part in enterprises.
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APPENDIX B. CITATIONS OF "NON-ECONOMIC" ENTERPRISES
The following is a small but representative sample of the citations from
our NEXIS search which denote non-economic enterprises in several
categories. The key word enterprise has been italicized for ease of reference.
Academic/scholarly: "Local history enterprises are at their best when they
bring together professional historians and local citizens."
Artistic/musical/creative: "The United States has made possible all manner of
extraordinary artistic enterprises-for example, the distinctly American
triumphs in ballet of George Balanchine and Lincoln Kirstein."
Educational: "It's become very clear that all of the dimensions of our lives are
very intimately linked to the improvement of our educational enterprise."
Government: "The party advocates making government enterprises and schools
private, cutting taxes, ending rent control... and phasing out Social Security."
Journalistic: "Mr. Vecchione said of the [NBC series featuring Dr. Koop]: 'I
don't consider it a journalistic enterprise. I consider it consider it in the realm
of information programming and public affairs."'
Scientific/research: "This allegation of fraud is both without basis and
irrelevant to Dr. Baltimore's qualifications for leading a world-class scientific
enterprise."
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APPENDIX C. SURVEY ITEMS
Survey A asked whether the following six examples were enterprises:
A weekly Bible study group directed by a Lutheran minister conducts
discussion of various New Testament verses. The group's only
activity is the Bible discussions.
The Coalition for Fair Adoption Laws (CFAL) is a highly organized
national network of non-profit organizations representing adoptive
parents and persons seeking to adopt. The executive directors of the
member organizations comprise the steering committee of CFAL.
CFAL's activities include lobbying, rallies, and planning
demonstrations at courts and adoption agencies.
Fifty Civil War enthusiasts meet once a year to re-enact part of the
Battle of Gettysburg. Each person covers his own expenses and
contributes $100 towards the costs of the re-enactment; there is a
loose steering committee of five who do the pre-event organizing.
The Independent Quebec Organization is a terrorist group that robs
banks and extorts money from wealthy, French-speaking Canadians
to finance its bombing, arson, and assassination activities.
A small company (10 stockholders, 30 employees) manufactures and
sells vending machines.
The Internal Revenue Service.
Survey B asked about the following six examples:
Five people, who had never met before, play poker one night at a
casino table in Las Vegas.
The Movement for Fair Adoption Laws (MFAL) is an unstructured
network of political activists, who favor freer adoption. With much
intercommunication among "members," MFAL's activities consist of,
among other things, planning demonstrations at courts and adoption
agencies.
Eleven middle-aged men play touch football games every weekend
against seven other such teams. The team members do not know each
other outside the context of the team. The teams contribute $500
each toward a $4000 pot to be won by the champion team at the end
of the summer.
The IBM (International Business Machines) Corporation.
Three children selling lemonade on a street-corner.
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The United Auto Workers.
Survey C contained four items from Survey A: the weekly bible study group,
the Coalition for Fair Adoption Laws, the Independent Quebec Organization,
and the Internal Revenue Service. It also contained two items identical to
those of Survey B: the three children selling lemonade and the United Auto
Workers.
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APPENDIX D. EXAMPLES OF THE "WHY/WHY NOT" RESPONSES
The following data illustrate the strength of the relationship between the
two ways of identifying an enterprise, the "having a goal" and the "seeking a
profit" approaches, and the scores given for a particular question. The
information below combines the answers from San Diego State University
students and Washington University students to the "Why/Why Not" question
in regard to whether the Coalition for Fair Adoption Laws (CFAL) is an
enterprise. The first column contains the subject numbers (with an asterisk
denoting Washington University subjects), the second column indicates the
scores of the subjects' answers, and the third column contains the subjects'
"Why/Why Not" responses.
A3 7 This group is specifically organized to do something.
A9 7 Undertaking a specific goal
*A2 7 Because it is an organization that raises $ and seeks
members to carry out its intentions
*A4 7 It has leadership and a goal
Al 6 They're gathering in order to achieve something in
society.
A2 6 Clear goals with measurable outcome re laws,
procedures, successes.
A5 6 [no response]
A10 6 Tight focus or purpose; goal
A5 6 Maybe not bec. is non-profit groups
*A6 6 Speading idea enterprise of "selling" idea
IA9 6 [no response]
A7 5 They are organized in an effort to do something
.A1 5 They are all working together
:::AlO 5 Have an established goal
A4 4 In one sense yes because it is a sort of business, but no
because I also have an idea that it should make money.
All 4 [no answer]
A 13 4 [no answer]
-A3 4 I have no clue
A6 2 This group is non-profit
A12 2 I'm sticking with business
_A7 2 [no response]
*A8 2 Non-profit
AS 1 This would imply commercial undertones
Overall average: 4.7
1994] 1623
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APPENDIX E. GENERALIZATIONS FROM THE "WHY/WHY NOT" RESPONSES
All 23 respondents to Survey A, and 28 of the 33 respondents to Survey
B, responded meaningfully to at least some of the "Why/Why Not" questions.
(Irrelevant responses such as "Maybe" were excluded.) The properties of the
potential "enterprises" that subjects mentioned in their responses are listed in
Table A.
TABLE A.
Property Number of subjects Total number of
who mentioned the times mentioned
property
Profit orientation 33 (64.7%) 111
Goal orientation 28 (53.9%) 72
Having group unity; cohesion 13 (25.5%) 40
Being formal, serious, or "official" 11 (21.6%) 6
Having structure 8 (15.7%) 11
Having a certain size 8 (15.7%) 5
Unlawfulness or "Negativity" 7 (13.7%) 6
Being private vs. governmental 6 (11.8%) 8
In Table A, the percentages add up to more than 100% because some subjects
mentioned more than one property. The group of 28 subjects who mentioned
goal orientation does not include subjects who mentioned profit orientation
without identifying this as a goal, even though profit-seeking is a kind of goal.
The "Why/Why Not" data can also be used to classify subjects with
respect to the two leading criteria, profit orientation and goal orientation.
Table B gives the numbers of respondents to Surveys A and B who mentioned
either, both, or neither of these criteria.
TABLE B.
Criteria Number of subjects mentioning those criteria
Profit, but not Goal 21 (10 Survey A, 11 Survey B)
Goal, but not Profit 16 (6 Survey A, 10 Survey B)
Goal and Profit 12 (6 Survey A, 6 Survey B)
Neither Goal nor Profit 2 (0 Survey A, 2 Survey B)
Table B shows that of the 23 Survey A respondents who provided "Why/Why
Not" rationales, 12 mentioned goal orientation in their rationale for at least one
of their judgments, and 16 mentioned profit orientation. It also shows that of
the 29 Survey B respondents who provided "Why/Why Not" rationales, 16
mentioned goal orientation and 17 mentioned profit orientation. Among all
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respondents who provided "Why/Why Not" rationales, 31% mentioned "goal"
alone, 41% mentioned "profit" alone, 41% mentioned both "goal" and "profit,"
and 4% mentioned neither.

